




CONCLUDING POSTSCRIPT TO
THE ORIGIN OF THE MALAY SHA'IR



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by

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CONCLUDING POSTSCRIPT¹ TO THE ORIGIN OF THE MALAY SHA'IR

They make additions, alterations, blot out, write anew,
amend, interline, turn it upside down, and yet can never
please their fickle judgment, but that they shall dislike
the next hour what they penn'd the former...

ERASMUS—*The Praise of Folly* (1509).

This Postscript pertains to my book entitled *The Origin of the Malay Sha'ir*.² The necessity for writing this Postscript became apparent to me when Dr. P. Voorhoeve, in a letter from Barchem, Holland, dated April 13, 1968, posed certain questions the substance of which is later published in a short *Note* bearing the same title as my book.³ It is hoped that what follows will clarify lingering obscurities and banish nagging doubts that still plague the minds and hearts of those who strive to expound and unravel scholastic problems pertaining to the Islamic aspect of Malay literary history.

Before I begin, however, there are certain preliminary critical comments I would like to make on some of Voorhoeve's ideas, and in particular those implied and found published in his two-page *Note* referred to already. Considered in themselves, some of the questions posed me by Voorhoeve in his letters⁴ are, in my opinion, for the most part quite trivial in the sense that the 'problems' posed arise not so much because

1. With apologies to Sören Kierkegaard.

2. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1968 (February). Hereafter cited as *Origin*.

3. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)*, deel 124, 2e aflevering, 's-Gravenhage, 1968, pp. 277–8. Hereafter cited as *Note*.

4. What is relevant here are the letters dated April 13, 1968 as mentioned and another dated September 17, 1968. I thank Voorhoeve for granting my request to quote them.

of the problematic nature of the object of study and research, but more so because of the fallacious reasoning of the scholar, and his failure to comprehend the true nature of the subject of inquiry, which extends over many fields of study, the most important being Muslim philosophical mysticism or *taṣawwuf*. With due respect and admiration for the philologico-bibliographical studies to which Voorhoeve has devoted his learning, but without the slightest intention of endeavouring to compare us with certain personalities or implying similarities in academic achievements and relationship between the personalities, I would still like to say—with apologies to Aristotle: *Amicus Voorhoeve, sed magis amica veritas*. It seems to me that Voorhoeve's two-page Note, of which in fact one and a half are ostensibly devoted to the 'subject', does not justify such a title, for in this case it appears somewhat grandiloquent so that it reminds me of the Chinese proverb: 'I hear the thunder—but no rain!' Voorhoeve says in his short Note that it was Teeuw's article⁵ that brought him welcome confirmation of a thesis put forward in a lecture he gave for the students of Malay at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris in 1952.⁶ He further says that his hypothesis and Teeuw's ascribe the origin of the *sha'ir* to Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī.⁷ But are their 'hypotheses' really hypotheses, or merely guesses?—or are their 'hypotheses' simply demonstrations not so much of ascribing the origin of the *sha'ir* to Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, but more correctly of ascribing the conceivability, the possibility of the origin of the *sha'ir* to Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī? My answer to these questions is given in detail in my book on the origin of the Malay *sha'ir*. I say: "To be able to say that Ḥamzah's works are possibly the origin of the Malay *sha'ir* is not so much a hypothesis as it is a statement on what several other scholars have also been thinking; a guess based on what appears to be self-evident which, however, is not supported by sufficient knowledge of the facts. Furthermore some scholars have noted that as far as they know, Ḥamzah's *sha'irs* are the earliest in Malay literature as we know it. But what is more fundamental is to be able to say that Ḥamzah invented and originated the Malay *sha'ir* and to demonstrate the reasonableness of such a conclusion; to be

5. *The Malay sha'ir, problems of origin and tradition*, BKL, deel 121, 4c aflevering, 's-Gravenhage, 1966, pp. 429–46. Hereafter cited as *Teeuw*.

6. Note, p. 277.

7. *Loc. cit.*

able to say *why* he did so and *how*; to be able to show *what* his sources were and to be able to relate them with some coherent idea as to the extent of their influence in Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī's *sha'ir*.⁸ In this sense, therefore, it is not correct to say that I have proposed the *same* 'hypothesis' as those proposed by Voorhoeve and Teeuw.⁹ Although in point of time my hypothesis is conceived and formulated between Voorhoeve's lecture in 1952 and Teeuw's article in 1966, in point of idea—which is more important—it is between no one. It is also not entirely correct to say without qualification that I proposed my hypothesis in an unpublished thesis as that could give the impression that the thesis is mouldering somewhere in the dark recesses of some library, and that Voorhoeve himself had seen it, both of which are not true. The thesis is being published¹⁰—and has been in the process of publication since 1966.¹¹ I myself informed him of this fact when I spent a delightful day with him at his charming home in Barchem on June 20, 1967, and gave him to understand, the very same day, that I was preparing a book to be entitled *The Origin of the Malay Sha'ir*, in which the theory that Ḥamzah created and originated the Malay *sha'ir* would be set forth in positive detail. It might perhaps be during this meeting, or subsequent to it, that the title for his own short *Note* was suggested to him although he might have forgotten it¹² and has inadvertently perhaps omitted any mention of this episode in his writing anywhere. Indeed, it seems to me that the formulation of the title for his short *Note* could not have been conceived without reference to my visit to Barchem and what I said there. It seems to me more accurate, then, not to ascribe the "welcome confirmation" of his 'thesis' ascribing the origin of the *sha'ir* to Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī to Teeuw's article nor, indeed, to the 'hypothesis' set forth therein, for if so then why did the article and its contents—which appeared in 1966—not awaken in him the expected immediate response, the urge

8. *Origin*, pp. 39–40.

9. *Note*, p. 278.

10. See University of Malaya Press, 1968/69, Kuala Lumpur, complete list, p. 4.

11. Cf. *Origin*, p. 1. It is now out on sale!

12. He must indeed have forgotten it because almost a year later he wrote (letter of April 13, 1968) saying that he heard a 'rumour' that I formulated my hypothesis in a lecture at Kuala Lumpur sometime between his own lecture and Teeuw's article! It was no rumour he heard since I told this to him myself at Barchem and that my lecture was based upon what I had written in my thesis Cp. *Origin*, p. 1).

to proclaim the confirmation soon after, seeing that this proclamation is couched in a meagre *Note* which, however, only came two years later in 1968? Voorhoeve was in fact still in doubt after reading Teeuw's article, and it was only in 1967 during our meeting and what I said then with reference to my book on the origin of the Malay *sha'ir* that the "welcome confirmation" dawned upon him. It was this episode, I suggest, that ought to have been acknowledged as the true progenitor of Voorhoeve's sense of welcome confirmation of the correctness of a *guess* he ventured in 1952.

Be that as it may, all that remains to be said here is that with reference to his *Note* from the first page (277) to the last paragraph of the last page (278), I find no necessity to write any further comment. Critical analysis of all that he had stated there can be regarded as having been anticipated and dealt with in my book¹³ dealing with Teeuw's ideas on the subject, and no further elaboration is needed since all of Voorhoeve's arguments appear to be the same as those formulated in greater detail by Teeuw.

After receiving my *New light on the life of Hamzah Fanşūrī*¹⁴ in which among other hypotheses I put forward the hypothesis that Hamzah was born in Shahr Nawī or Ayut'ia, the old capital of the Kingdom of Siam founded in 1350, Voorhoeve wrote saying that he thought the hypothesis a sound one "...though, owing to the many possibilities of interpretation of mystical verse; it will probably never be possible to reach absolute certainty, unless some quite new data should become available."¹⁵ Here we find again the ubiquitous example of the familiar voice of doubt whispering incredulity. It is true that there are many possibilities of interpretation of mystical verse, but I am not there interpreting mystical verse as such, as the term 'mystical verse' in that context refers to a general literary concept, i.e. it refers to *all* verses that are mystical. What I am there interpreting is *certain particular* mystical verses—*six* to be exact—ultimately reduced to *one* key verse:

Hamzah nin asalnya Fanşūrī
Mendapat wujud ditanah Shahr Nawī

13. *I.e. Origin.*

14. *JMBRAS*, vol. 40, pt. 1, Kuala Lumpur, 1967.

15. *Barchem*, April 13, 1968.

Beroleh khilāfat 'ilmu yang 'ālī
Daripada 'Abdu'l-Qādir Sayyid Jilānī.

This key verse is further reduced to the first half-verse which is further reduced ultimately to one word: *wujūd*. Since I am there interpreting only six particular mystical verses, there are then not *many* but *limited* possibilities of interpretation, and the extent and depth of that limitation has already been explored as far as my knowledge permits at this stage. He who says that there are many possibilities of interpretation of these six mystical verses must demonstrate the truth of such a statement by *showing* that they are susceptible of other numerous interpretations; if he cannot do so then it is best to acknowledge the worth of the interpretation given and observe silence. Furthermore, since we speak about interpretation of Muslim mystical verses, who indeed would be best equipped to do so and judge its correctness but a scholar in Muslim mystical literature? He says further that "it will probably never be possible to reach absolute certainty" in the matter. Is it necessary to reach *absolute certainty* in the knowledge that Ḥamzah was born in Shahr Nawī? If it is, then such necessity is important, and if it is important, why not accept the hypothesis provisionally in order that action might be performed and knowledge thereof increased? Or is it necessary that in all historical situations one must set as one's goal always some unattainable certainty, even abstraction like an imaginary quantity in algebra, so that the human intellect might achieve some unspeakable benefit? A theory or a hypothesis as I understand it is something verifiable, but not verified, and yet here Voorhoeve is seeking verified testimony! His next phrase completing the sentence: "...unless some quite new data should become available," reveals the truth in my last remark. The "new data" should clearly be what I say in my article which lies before him within easy reach, on which subject no one else has written—but no, Voorhoeve seems now to be looking for nothing less than Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī's birth certificate, certified true and signed to boot by the *Walikota* himself! In my article I said that Ḥamzah's dates of birth and death are unknown and have not yet been established. Since there is, as far as I know, no way of establishing these dates, it would be futile to speculate upon this question. Furthermore, this question is, fortunately, of no great importance. But it is important at least to

establish the span of period in which he lived and flourished.¹⁶ In his *Note* we find Voorhoeve again creating his own difficulty by asking for no less than knowledge of the *exact* period when Ḥamzah lived. In virtue of this demand—which seems to me unreasonable—his conclusion, which reads:

Therefore, if Ḥamzah really created the Malay *sha'ir* and an anonymous poem in *sha'ir* style was composed during the reign of Sulṭān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh, we can only conclude that Ḥamzah lived at a still earlier date.¹⁷

should in fact be amended to read:

Therefore, if Ḥamzah really created the Malay *sha'ir* and an anonymous poem in *sha'ir* style was composed during the reign of Sulṭān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh, we can only conclude that Ḥamzah lived at a still earlier date, *and we still do not know when exactly Ḥamzah lived.*

Voorhoeve concluded as he did that Ḥamzah lived *before* 1588 and not also *through* 1588 to between then and 1604 as I did. While my conclusion in the matter of the span of period in which Ḥamzah lived and flourished limits it to between the period before 1588 and up to 1604, Voorhoeve's conclusion in the matter of when exactly Ḥamzah lived breaks the limit to unknown points in time: it could for that matter be between 1588 and 1488—or even 1388 (?)! In any case, even if Voorhoeve's guess in the above matter is acceptable, it is not necessarily so that “we can only conclude that Ḥamzah lived at a still earlier date”. Why can we not also conclude that Ḥamzah lived contemporaneously with the “anonymous” composer of the “poem in *sha'ir* style”?¹⁸ In my opinion, however, Voorhoeve's guess is not acceptable as it is not

16. *Op. cit.*, JMBRAS, vol. 40, pt. 1, 1967, p. 48. In fact, I have pointed this out as early as 1961 in my *Rāniri and the Wujūdiyyah of 17th century Aceh*, Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, III, Singapore, 1966.

17. *Note*, p. 278.

18. The poem in question, in fact, is not in “*sha'ir* style”—it *is* *sha'ir*! This seems to emphasize the point that if Ḥamzah was the originator of the *sha'ir*, the poem was indeed composed by him. See further below, pp. 11 fol.

based on sufficient grounds for reasonable doubt. He gives two reasons for doubting Ḥamzah's authorship of the *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Ilmū'l-Nisā'*, on which poem my hypothesis placing Ḥamzah's period to coincide with that of Sulṭān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh is based:

- (i) in that because Doorenbos' work¹⁹ included not only some anonymous poems of dubious origin, but even verse in which the names of the authors, not Ḥamzah, are clearly stated;²⁰
- (ii) in that the manuscript (Leiden Cod. Or. 2016) and two other manuscripts (Leiden Cod. Or. 5635 and London SOAS 41755), including a Bugis version of the same poem,²¹ do not mention Ḥamzah as being the author of the poem.²²

In order to demonstrate the weakness of the above arguments, which have to my knowledge never been questioned, it is necessary to discern the main causes that have determined the line of reasoning that is responsible for formulating them. Thirty-six years ago, in 1933, Doorenbos presented to the world a romanized Malay 'edition' of the works of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī. The 'edition' is so greatly in need of much improvement, however, that it can hardly be fair and reasonable to make authoritative judgments about Ḥamzah based simply on Doorenbos' presentation of Ḥamzah's works and ideas found therein. The above sentence should never be construed to mean, or even imply in the least, that Ḥamzah's texts in Doorenbos' 'edition' are bad and not representative of Ḥamzah's genius, but rather that Doorenbos' *handling* of the texts is bad, and that consequently Ḥamzah's genius suffered at the hands of such ineptitude. Interpretations of Ḥamzah's ideas based on the texts, whether in Doorenbos' 'edition' or in brief and often futile attempts at metaphysical expositions later propounded by certain scholars based on Doorenbos' reading of the texts, attest to the truth of what I have just stated above; it was Coleridge interpreting Kant—no, perhaps much less than Coleridge! Indeed, not only Ḥamzah's genius suffered, but his texts made known to us by Doorenbos equally suffered grave accusations of doubt as to their authenticity, so that we have to sustain the

19. *De Geschriften van Hamzah Pansoori*, Leiden, 1933.

20. Mentioned in his letter to me dated Barchem, 13 April 1968. See also *Note*, p. 278. The reference to "authors" here is to Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl.

21. Mentioned in his letter to me referred to in note 20 above.

22. See *Note*, p. 278.

paradox that for thirty-six years now, in spite of the fact that the Dutch scholars know of Doorenbos' failings, he yet influences them in their judgements on matters connected with Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī till the present day.

Nineteen years after Drewes drew attention in 1933 to the inadequacies found in Doorenbos' work,²³ Teeuw extended the range in which suspicion is cast to another set of verses known to be Ḥamzah's work: the *Sha'ir Dagang* (Leiden Cod. Or. 3374). In an Inaugural Lecture, he remarked, with reference to the *Sha'ir Dagang*, that "the poor quality of the rhyme is indeed itself a strong argument (and not the only one) against Ḥamzah's presumed authorship."²⁴ The remark is echoed, ten years later, by Skinner.²⁵ We do not know what other 'strong arguments' Teeuw can adduce in support of the contention that Ḥamzah is not the author of the *Sha'ir Dagang*, but the above argument is certainly not strong. It is not true to say that the quality of the *rhyme* of the *Sha'ir Dagang* is poor; the quality of the rhyme is good and compares favourably with Ḥamzah's other verses. It is the quality of the content that is comparatively (with Ḥamzah's other verses) 'poor', in the sense that it is, or rather *seems*, less esoteric and sophisticated than his other "mystical verses." But even in this case, the *Sha'ir Dagang* does in fact contain some profound elements of mysticism.²⁶ If, then, the quality of the content and manner of presentation of the ideas are not quite as 'developed' intellectually and mystically as those found in Ḥamzah's other *sha'irs*, that fact does not necessarily mean that the poem is not of Ḥamzah's authorship. Indeed, it could have been written during the early, initial stages of Ḥamzah's intellectual development and mystical progress. Why should it be assumed that good poets and writers write necessarily brilliant works the moment they first begin to write? It is obvious to the point of plain common sense to know that such an assumption is fallacious, for the general rule applicable not only to poets

23. In his review of Doorenbos' book published in the *Tijdschrift voor het Bataviaasche Genootschap (TBG)*, vol. 73, 1933, pp. 391-98.

24. A Teeuw, *Taal en Versbouw*, Amsterdam, 1952, p. 26, note 269.

25. C. Skinner, *Sja'ir Perang Mengkasar*, *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut (VKI)*, vol. 40, 1963, p. 37, note 196.

26. Even the title: *Dagang* (Ar. *gharīb*) conveys a mystical sense. Cp. my *New light on the life of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī*, *JMBRAS*, vol. 40, pt. 1, 1967, pp. 45-46 and notes.

and writers, but to other artists as well and to all manner of professions—in fact to all life—is that all nature undergoes stages of development. It is no doubt such fallacious assumptions and judgements that have contributed to the confusion and doubt that have enshrouded Ḥamzah and his works in an ever-thickening cloud of academic 'mystery'. The apparent 'names' of the author of the *Shā'ir Daqāq* as they appear no less than three times in the text of the poem²⁷ should not be assumed as referring to more than one person who are none of them Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, but they should be understood rather as symbolic references to the author himself, who is none other than Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī. To take one example, on page 25 of the text towards the end of the poem we find:

Inilah karangan *Si Tukar* yang hina,
Sambil mengarang berhati hiba...

This is the work of the lowly *Tukar*,
Who composed it with a heart full of longing...

The word *tukar* means 'to barter' or 'to exchange', also 'barter' and 'exchange' (in the sense of a person or thing, whether tangible or abstract, for another). In the latter sense, the word *tukar* can be taken to mean a sacrifice in which a person is replaced by another, or something else, such as the ram being taken as a sacrifice in place of Ismā'il in the story of Ibrāhīm. The significant connection between Ḥamzah and Ismā'il and the sacrifice (*qurbān*) is seen in the following half-verse:

Ḥamzah miskīn orang 'uryānī,
Seperti Ismā'il menjadi qurbānī...²⁸

Ḥamzah the 'poor' is a 'naked' person,
Like Ismā'il he becometh a sacrifice...

The word 'poor' here refers to the mystical 'poverty' (*faqr*), i.e. one deprived of the phenomenal self, and hence such a one is 'naked', i.e. stripped bare of creaturely qualities. We must also take note that Ḥamzah often refers to himself as a *gharīb*. The word *gharīb* in the sense in

27. Doorenbos and others were unable to decipher the 'names'. One of them reads: *sīn, yā', tā', wāw, kāf, rā* = *Si Tukar*, (see above); the other two are identical and they read: *sīn, yā', tā', mīm, thā', yā', rā* (the last letter *rā* is in my opinion a mistake for *lām*: *Si Tamthīf*).

28. Cod. Or. 3374, p. 11.

which the Ṣūfis use it always refers to the self who is 'a stranger' to the world, or one whose native place is not the world. Such use of the word is most probably a direct influence of a *Ḥadīth* (Saying) of the Prophet:

Kun fi'l-dunyā ka'annaka gharībun aw 'ābiru sabīlin wa 'udda nafsaka min aṣḥābi'l-qubūr.

Be in this world as if thou wert a stranger, or one who is in a stage on his journey, and count thyself as among the occupants of the grave.²⁹

Now the word *dagang* as used by Ḥamzah translates the word *gharīb*. It refers to the stranger who wanders in a foreign land, the merchant or trader who goes abroad to sell his merchandise, or to barter or exchange it for something else. This mystical connotation of the word *dagang*, strongly influenced by the Arabic *gharīb*, and no doubt by the fact that the profession of merchant or trader was invariably practised by foreigners (e.g. Arabs, Persians, Indians), denotes the Ṣūfi or traveller on the Mystic Path (*sālik*) who regards himself as a stranger to the world and who goes about bartering his merchandise—i.e. his phenomenal self—in exchange for the attainment of higher selfhood. The following exhortation by Ḥamzah, in which the word *tukar* also appears, conveys the idea I have just explained:

Engkaulah Laut yang 'Āli,
Akan Chermin Tuhan yang Bāqī;
Tukarkan keruh dan ṣāfi
Supaya wāṣil dengan Rabbānī.³⁰

Thou art the Sublime Ocean,
Like unto a Mirror of [thy] Lord Abiding;
Barter the dross for the pure
So that [thou be] united with thy Lord.

29. Ḥamzah himself echoes this:
Hidup dalam dunyā upama dagang,
Datang musim kita 'kan pulang.
We live in this world like strangers,
When the season cometh we will return.

Cod. Or. 2016, p. 78.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Ḥamzah in his *sha'irs* makes use of the Sūfī connotation or conception of *gharīb* (*Anak Dagang*) in numerous instances.³¹ It is not here intended, however, to present detailed conceptual interpretation of the mystical elements found in the *Sha'ir Dagang* in order to prove their unmistakable identities with those found in the other *Sha'irs* by Ḥamzah, since I feel that that would not be necessary. Suffice me to assure all that in this case the copyist of the text himself maintains and records that the *Sha'ir Dagang* is Ḥamzah's *Sha'ir* (*Sha'ir Dagang Ḥamzah Fansūrī*),³² and no reasonable grounds can be adduced to question the validity of that assertion!

To return to the doubts that plague Voorhoeve's mind respecting Ḥamzah's authorship of the *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Ilmū'l-Nisā'*, one of them is that none of the manuscripts containing the poem mentions Ḥamzah as the author of the *sha'ir*. But it does not necessarily follow that the fact that no known manuscript of the poem mentions Ḥamzah as being the author of that *sha'ir* must mean that the *sha'ir* is not of Ḥamzah's authorship. There are several *sha'irs* that do not 'mention' Ḥamzah as being the author, and yet we know that they are Ḥamzah's work. 'We know' not because Doorenbos compiled them and bound them in a single volume entitled *The works of Ḥamzah Fansūrī*, which is a fallacious assumption, but because the semantic role of the key words and terms, the form and manner of deploying them in verse, the conceptual structures and interrelated network of the semantic fields within the *sha'irs* in question tally with those evident in the others and in the prose works as a whole. It is the work of one and the same person only that can produce such an integrated system of thought.

Since we are here placing Ḥamzah's period to coincide with that of Shāh 'Ālam ('Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh, *Sayyid al-Mukammāl*) based on the *sha'ir* in the *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Ilmū'l-Nisā'* in which Shāh 'Ālam is mentioned, and since Voorhoeve doubts that the poem was composed by Ḥamzah because his name is not mentioned as the author, it is of decisive importance for me to show now, in order to maintain my contention that Ḥamzah was a contemporary of Shāh 'Ālam, that the above poem is not the only one which mentions Shāh 'Ālam. There is

31. Cp. the reference in note 26 above.

32. Cod. Or. 3374, p. 18. See also *Origin*, pp. 12-15.

another, in the same text of the same manuscript (Cod. Or. 2016),³³ which mentions the name Shāh 'Ālam:

Aho segala kita anak Ādam!
Jangan lupa akan Shāh 'Ālam,
Pada Baḥr al-Dhunūb jangan terkaram,
Supaya 'āshiq siang dan malam,

Literally:

O ye all sons of Adam!
Do not be heedless of Shāh 'Ālam,
Do not be drowned in the Sea of Sins,
So that thou mayest be a lover day and night.

Although the text of the manuscript does not mention Ḥamzah as being the composer of the above *sha'ir*, yet in another manuscript containing the same poem (Cod. Or. 3374),³⁴ any lingering doubt as to his authorship of the poem is dispelled in that the text clearly indicates that Ḥamzah is the author by entitling the poem: *Sha'ir Ḥamzah*. Cod. Or. 2016 entitles the poem: *Sha'ir Jāwī faṣl fī bayān 'Ilm al-Sulūk wa'l-Tawḥīd*. Moreover, this is not the only instance where the title *Sha'ir Jāwī*, etc. in Cod. Or. 2016 is substituted for *Sha'ir Ḥamzah* in Cod. Or. 3374,³⁵ which fact clearly seems to me to indicate that all the poems entitled *Sha'ir Jāwī*, etc. in Cod. Or. 2016 are invariably none other than *Sha'ir Ḥamzah*, thus establishing the fact that all those poems are of Ḥamzah's authorship.³⁶

Now then, to return to the *sha'ir* quoted above, it is of course clear that Ḥamzah's reference to Shāh 'Ālam there refers to God. Shāh 'Ālam in that context is the same as *Rabbu'l-'Ālam(in)*, which term is in fact used in the last line of the next *bayt*. Yet, it seems to me no mere coincidence, nor simply for the sake of rhyme alone, that Shāh 'Ālam is used to express God's Sovereignty as Lord and Ruler of the Universe. Moreover, it is a significant fact that—with the exception of the reference to Shāh 'Ālam in the *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Ilmu'l-Nisā'*—no other reference

33. Page 52 of the Ms.

34. Page 13 of the Ms.

35. See for example pp. 50 in Cod. Or. 2016, and p. 12 in Cod. Or. 3374.

36. The above important point also serves to drive home my argument against Teeuw's doubts with regard to the authenticity of Ḥamzah's texts. See Teeuw, p. 435, and *Origin*, pp. 20–1.

to or mention of Shāh 'Ālam is found in all of Ḥamzah's writings that have come down to us. It were as though Ḥamzah purposely intends, by using the expression *Shāh 'Ālam*, to convey to his readers the notion of the human Shāh 'Ālam who is actually living and ruling and lording over them in his earthly splendour, and to remind them that that Shāh 'Ālam is merely a shadow of the Real One, possessed of no real Sovereignty and even Existence and, therefore, must not be the sole subject of one's heedfulness, which must be directed solely to the True Lord of the Universe. Indeed, such play of words is very often employed by Ṣūfī poets who are invariably adepts in the art of punning. Such, also would be a Ṣūfī understanding and interpretation of the true meaning of the title: *Zillu 'Llāh fi'l-'Ālam*—Shadow of God upon Earth—a title then used by the Sulṭāns of Aceh and still in use by Malay Sulṭāns. Finally, the very existence of the title *Shāh 'Ālam* in Ḥamzah's *sha'ir* must mean that it coincides with the period of the Sulṭān who bears it, otherwise it would be difficult to imagine that it could occur at all with such exactitude and historical precision.

The *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Iḥu'l-Nisā'* is also called the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* (literally; The Sea of Women). The word *baḥr* means deep slit, cleft, long and wide cleavage filled with abundant water—hence the meaning denotes a deep sea or wide and long river. The analogy of the sea or ocean symbolizing God in His Essential Absoluteness and Unity, His manifold aspects of Multiplicity, His Predispositions (*shu'ūn*) and Existential Modes of Being (*wujūd*) occupies a dominant position in Ḥamzah's thoughts as reflected in his writings, both in verse and prose. No other Malay or indigenous poet or writer—as far as we know—has extensively and consistently employed the analogy of the sea in the above mentioned context in a manner comparable with Ḥamzah's philosophico-mysaltic modes of expression and intellectual precision respecting analogical concepts. To the uninitiated, the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* would seem no more than a curious—even blasphemous—example of erotic poetry. The true subject of its discourse, however, revolves around the central concept of gnosis (*ma'rifah*) and the related subjects such as the Holy Prophet's Ascension to the Highest Heaven (*mī'rāj*), his Beatific Vision of the Truth, which marks the finality of gnosis, his attainment of close proximity to God (*qurb*, expressed in the words *qāba qawsaynī aw adnā*)

—all recorded in the Qur'ān in the Chapter of the Star.³⁷ As I have stated earlier,³⁸ my opinion that the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is Ḥamzah's work is not based simply on the fact that the poem is found bound in a single volume together with some of his other works.³⁹ It is based more upon discernment of similarities in the semantic role of the key words and terms, the form and manner of deploying them in verse, the conceptual structures and interrelated network of the semantic fields in the poem in question in relation to his other prose works and verses. It is also based on direct apprehension of the fact of the poem itself, which has no exact equivalent in style and formal structure, in other mystical poems in Malay, as far as we know, except in relation to and in comparison with Ḥamzah's verses. Even in the case of verses composed by Shamsu'l-Dīn of Pasai, who was perhaps the closest to Ḥamzah in terms of mystical ideas set forth in writing and in terms of historical period, we find that his attempt at versification, in one example called the *Dhikr Dā'irah Qāba Qawsayni aw Adnā*,⁴⁰ falls far below the standard set by Ḥamzah's verses. Moreover, in the *Dhikr Dā'irah* alone, many mystical terms are found used by Shamsu'l-Dīn which, significantly, are not found in Ḥamzah's works.

The *Baḥr al-Nisā'* bears close conceptual relationship with many of Ḥamzah's verses and his prose works as well, but it is particularly related conceptually to his verses on the *Qāba Qawsayn*—the 'Two Bow-Lengths' of mystical proximity to God represented symbolically by two drawn bows whose ends and strings meet symbolizing the Circle (*dā'irah*) of Mystical Union (*waṣṭ*).⁴¹ In the Qur'ān, the word *baḥr* is used in the dual sense conveying mystical connotation: *al-Baḥrayn*, referring to the Two Seas separated by a Barrier (*al-Barzakh*).⁴² From Ḥamzah's verses it can be conceived that the two drawn bows whose ends and strings meet symbolizing the Circle of Mystical Union is seen as a circle

37. *Sūrah* 53:1–18.

38. See above, p. 11.

39. Irrespective of the idea as to whether I am here referring to Doorenbos' work or to the manuscript (Cod. Or. 2016).

40. Cod. Or. 1332, Library, Leiden University. See also *Shamsu'l-Dīn van Pasai*, C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Leiden, 1945, pp. 313–6. A list of Shamsu'l-Dīn's works is given in *ibid.*, pp. 25–6.

41. Cod. Or. 2016, pp. 65–8.

42. Qur'ān, 55:19–20; see also the reference to Moses and Khidr in 18:60; see further 25:53; 23:99–100.

diametrically divided into equal halves by the vertical line within it. Each of the halves symbolizes each of the Two Seas and the line separating it is the Barrier. Hence Ḥamzah says in one of his verses:⁴³

- A. *Baḥrayn* itu terlalu 'ajib,
Barzakh diantaranya *bi Nūri'l-Ḥabīb*,
 Olehnya *zāhir* terlalu qarib
 Kelihatan jauh pada sekalian gharib.⁴⁴

and again:

- B. Orang *Qāba Qawsayn* itu seperti Kandang,
 Tali diantaranya bukannya benang,
Barzakh namanya disana terbentang,
 Ketiganya *wāḥid* yoga kau pandang.⁴⁵

Literally:

- A. The Two Seas evoke extreme wonder,
 The Barrier between is by the Light of the Beloved,
 Because it is manifest very 'near' [to the Self]
 It is seen as 'far' by all 'strangers'.

and:

- B. The Man of the Two Bow-Lengths is as [in] an Enclosure
 The String between them is not mere thread;
 Barrier it is that spreadeth there,
 Thou seest that the three are One.

In the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*, which is also referred to as the *Laut Nisā'*,⁴⁶ the *Barzakh* mentioned above is called by another name: the *Baḥr al-Nūr*—the Sea of Light, and 'Light' there refers to the Light of Muḥammad (*Nūr Muḥammad*) who is the Beloved (*al-Ḥabīb*) mentioned in line 2 of verse A above. Ḥamzah in the *Asrārul-'l-Ārifīn* quotes, among others, a saying of the Holy Prophet:

'*Awwal mā khalaqa' Llāhu Ta'ālā'l-nūr.*'

i.e.:

'The first thing which God created was the Light.'

43. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 65.

44. For the term *gharīb*, cf., above, pp. 8–10, notes 26 and 29 therein.

45. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 66.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 93, 96.

In another verse following verse A, above, Ḥamzah says:

- C. *Baḥrayn* itu ma'nānya dalam,
Menyatakan pertemuan Tuhan dan 'Ālam,
Inilah rahasia Nabī yang Khātam.⁴⁷
Menyalakan⁴⁸ 'āshiq tiada ia padam.⁴⁹

Literally:

- C. The meaning of Two Seas is deep [profound],
It revealeth the identity of God and the World,
This is the secret of the Prophet who is the Seal
Who illumineth the Beloved with undying light.

The interwoven connections between the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* and Ḥamzah's *shā'irs* and prose works can further be demonstrated in the discourse on the Idea or Reality of Muḥammad (*Ḥaqīqat Muḥammad*) as found, for example, in the *Asrār*,⁵⁰ where two *bayts* inserted in the beginning of a commentary says:

- D. Tatakala diḡāhirkān ketengah Padang,
Nyatalah 'ishq yang dalam Kandang,
Disanalah hukum pandang-memandang,
Berahi dan dendam tiada berselang.
- E. Dua *Qaws*, suatu Kandang,
Barzakh diantaranya pula terbentang,
Harus rā'ikan ini, Orang,
Upama tamthil besi dan pedang.

Literally:

- D. When to the Field's Centre [that Reality] is made
manifest,
Love that was in the Enclosure is made manifest,
There [the Lover and Beloved] gaze at Each Other
With passion and desire unassuaged.

47. Both the text and Doorenbos read: *khātim*, but it should rhyme with *dalam* and 'ālam.

48. My reading is the same as in the text. Doorenbos reads: *menyalakan*, which is incorrect.

49. Both the text and Doorenbos read: *qādim*. The reading is incorrect. The simile conveyed by *menyalakan* fits in well with *padam*. See also above, note 47.

50. Cod. Or. 7291 (I), Library, Leiden University, pp. 16–80.

- E. Two Bows, one Enclosure,
Between them a Barrier spreadeth.
One must envisage this as Man,
Like unto steel and the sword's blade.

Whether Ḥamzah's verses above are wandering verses or not is immaterial to our purpose as in the prose text they serve the appropriate context. What is important to note here in connection with the *Bahr al-Nisā'* is the reference to man (*orang*) and sword (*pedang*) in the last two lines of verse E. The Arabic equivalent of the Malay *orang* in Ḥamzah's mystical terminology is generally *insān* and *rijāl* (sing. *rajul*). The word *rajul* denotes a man in complete possession of his manly powers and faculties—a virile man, or a man possessing the qualities of manhood, and hence a complete and perfect man. Moreover, it is here significant to note that the term *rijāl* corresponds naturally with *nisā'* (women) as shown in the following example from the Qur'ān:

*Yā ayyuhā'l-nāsu'ttaqū rabbakumu'l-ladhi khalaqakum min nafsin wāhidatin wa khalaqa minhā zawjahā wa baththa min humā rijālan kathīran wa nisā'an.*⁵¹

O Mankind! reverence
Thy Guardian-Lord,
Who created you
From a single Soul,
Created, of like nature,
His mate, and from them twain
Scattered (like seeds)
Countless men and women.

There is in Ṣūfī terminology a conceptual connection between the terms *rijāl*, i.e. perfect men, and *al-insānu'l-kāmil*, i.e. the perfect man. Sometimes the term *Rijālu'l-Ghayb* (Men of the Unseen) is used to convey reference to exalted saints and angels, of whom six classes are described by 'Abdu'l-Karīm al-Jīlī in his celebrated book *Al-Insānu'l-Kāmil*.⁵² In Ḥamzah's writings, the term *orang kāmil* is meant to refer

51. 4:1. This chapter of the Qur'ān is called *Al-Nisā'*: The Women.

52. *Al-Insānu'l-Kāmil fī Ma'rifati'l-Awā'il wa'l-Awākhir*, Qāhīrah, 1375/1956, pp. 108, 42 fol.

to both the *rijāl* as well as the *insānī'l-kāmil*.⁵³ The Perfect Man or Universal Man referred to by all Šūfis is of course the Holy Prophet Muḥammad who, as the *Logos*, is the first created of God and is the Unique Prototype of all created beings. There is no doubt, it seems, that Ḥamzah has written a treatise whose title he gives as: *Al-Sayfu'l-Rijāl*, i.e. 'The Sword of Men',⁵⁴ which may even be no more than a set of verses like the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*. The fact that the treatise is mentioned in the same line of the verse alongside the title of another treatise called: *Al-Muntahī* (The Adept)—a prose work by Ḥamzah which I have edited and translated into English for the first time⁵⁵—reveals the nature of its contents as being in conformity with the explanation above. The title *Al-Muntahī* denotes the Holy Prophet, who in fact is called such by Šūfis as shown, for example, by al-Hujwīrī in his famous book *Kaṣṣf al-Maḥjūb*.⁵⁶ The connotation of the title very clearly points to the spiritual episode of the Holy Prophet's *mi'rāj* when he was transported to the Highest Heaven to behold 'the Greatest Sign of his Lord'⁵⁷ near the 'Tree of the Uttermost End' (*Sidratī'l-Muntahā*).⁵⁸ The combination of the terms *orang* and *pedang* in verse E above, and the identity of subject matter discussed, makes one see their connection with the *Sayf al-Rijāl*, itself inextricably woven into the discourse of the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*. Further examples where the term *rijāl* is meant or used in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* itself can be shown in the following half-verses.

- F. Jikalau kau dapat sharaṭku ini
Sempurnalah namamu laki-laki.⁵⁹

i.e.:

- F. If thou art able to fulfill this my condition
Then thou art truly and completely a man.

53. Cf., *Asrār*, pp. 40-3; Cod. Or. 2016, 27-8; 35, 71-2, 75, 79, 81; 65-6; Cod. Or. 3374, 12.

54. Cf., *Daripada Sayfu'l-Rijāl dan Muntahī*... Cod. Or. 2016, p. 91.

55. Cod. Or. 7291 (III), pp. 110-30. See my work *The Mysticism of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, chapters IX and XII. My work will hereafter be cited as *Mysticism*.

56. Translated from the Persian by R.A. Nicholson, Leyden-London, 1911, p. 168.

57. Qur'ān, 53:18.

58. See *Mysticism*, pt. II, Introduction.

59. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 96.

Laki-laki there means *rijāl* or *rajul*. Then again:

- G. Rijāl Allāh muda 'arifīn,
Memakai af'āl Khātam al-Nabiyyīn.⁶⁰

i.e.:

- G. The Men of God, youthful and gnostics all
Practise the works of the Seal of the Prophets.

Another interesting and significant conceptual connection between the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* and the *Sayf al-Rijāl* with reference to the Ṣūfī concept of *rijāl* is evident in the following verse in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*:

- H. Tatakala berlayar di Laut Nisā'
Dengan 'ilmu 'aqad yang sempurna;
Jawharnya amat burhāna,
Tiada bergerak dari Astana.⁶¹

Literally:

- H. When thou saileth the Sea of Women,
Equip thyself with the science of the perfect art of
Love;
Its true nature is of the utmost Proof,
Not moving from its Palatial Abode.

In line 3 of the verse, the word *jawhar*, an Arabic word derived from the Persian *gawhar*, means a jewel, a gem, an essence or substance, the secret and true nature of a thing; it can also mean the germ of life, and may mean a man of ability, which harks back to the notion of the complete man (*rajul*). It also means the streaks or markings on a fine blade of a sword (*sayf*). The last line of the verse: 'Not moving from its Palatial Abode', refers no doubt to the subject matter discussed also in Ibnu'l-'Arabī's celebrated verse which Ḥamzah quotes in the *Asrār* and the *Muntahī*:

- I. Kunna ḥurūṣan 'āliyātīn lam nuqal,
Muta 'alliqātīn fī dhurā a'lā'l-qulal:
Anā anta fīhī wa nahnu anta wa anta hū,
Fa'l-kullu fī hū hū fas'al 'an man waṣal.⁶²

60. Loc. cit.

61. Ibid., p. 98.

62. *Asrār*, pp. 36-7; *Muntahī*, p. 117.

That is:

1. We were Lofty Letters yet unmoved,
Attached to our Abode in the Highest Peaks;
I wast thou within It, and we wert thou and thou He,
Everything is in 'He is He'—ask of those in Union.

The Lofty Letters refer to the Primordial Potentialities (*Istī'dād Aṣṣī*) in the Divine Knowledge (*al-'Ilm*).⁶³ The singular form of the word *ḥurūf*, i.e. *ḥarf*, means, apart from 'letter', also 'edge' or 'sharp edge', 'border', 'rim', 'brink', 'verge'. It also means the 'cutting edge' of a sword. The above verse refers to letters which were yet in a state of potentiality latent, as it were, in the ink, and not yet dipped by pen or made to flow therefrom and transferred onto paper. It is an allusion to the Fixed Essences (*al-A'yām'l-Thābitah*) in the state of pre-creation. The manner in which God creates His creation is that first the 'creatures' are individualized in the Divine Knowledge in a transcendental manner without any differentiation. They are then made to exist synthetically and virtually in the 'Throne' (*al-'Arsh*), and are manifested analytically as potential existents in the 'Footstool' (*al-Kursī*). All these individualizations occur spiritually and the 'creatures' have not yet received the name 'creation', for they are not yet 'separate', as it were, from the Divine Essence (*al-Dhāt*). The third line of the verse quoted above suggests what is meant in the last sentence. The first objective individualization occurs in the 'Highest Pen' (*al-Qalam al-A'lā*), and here the Creator and the creatures become distinguished. The 'Pen' imprints the creatures' forms of existence on the 'Guarded Tablet' (*al-Lawḥ al-Maḥ-fūz*) as the mind, so to speak, imprints ideas on the soul. It can be seen how the symbolism of letters, ink, pen, tablet or paper fit in well with the above mentioned eschatological concepts well known among Ṣūfīs generally. In a treatise entitled *Al-Unmūdḥaj al-Farīd*,⁶⁴ Shaykh Aḥmad

63. The term *istī'dād* (potentialities), is closely connected with the term *ḥarf* above. For a further interpretation of the Ṣūfī doctrine in this connection and in what follows above, see *Mysticism*, Chapter III. See also *New light on the life of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī*, JMBRAS, vol. 40, pt. 1, 1967, p. 45, and the references in notes 12 and 13 therein.

64. 'The Book of the Unique Archetype', written circa 1910. M. Lings has provided us with an excellent translation of this treatise in his *A Moslem saint of the twentieth century*, London, 1961, pp. 148–57. Lings' book will hereafter be cited as *Lings*.

al-'Alawī, a Ṣūfī of Morocco, quotes from the *diwān* of another Ṣūfī the following poem which serves well to illustrate the above discussion:

The Letters are the signs of the ink; there is not one,
Save what the ink hath anointed; their own colour is pure illusion.
The *ink's* colour it is that hath come into manifest being.
Yet it cannot be said that the ink hath departed from what it was.
The inwardness of the letters lay in the ink's mystery,
And their outward show is through its self-determination.
They are its determinations, its activities,
And naught is there but it. Understand thou the parable!
They are not it; say not, say not that they are it!
To say so were wrong, and to say "it is they" were raving
madness.
For it was before the letters, when no letter was;
And it remaineth, when no letter at all shall be.
Look well at each letter; thou seest it hath already perished,
But for the face of the ink, that is, for the Face of His Essence,
Unto Whom All Glory and Majesty and Exaltation!
Even thus the letters, for all their outward show, are hidden,
Being overwhelmed by the ink, since their show is none other
than its,
The letter addeth naught to the ink, and taketh naught from it,
But revealeth its integrality in various modes,
Without changing the ink. Do ink and letter together make two?
Realize then the truth of my words: no being is there
Save that of the ink, for him whose understanding is sound;
And wheresoe'er be the letter, there with it is always its ink.
Open thine intellect unto these parables and heed them!⁶⁵

'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf of Singkel (d. circa 1693) has written a treatise on an interpretation of Ibnu'l-'Arabi's verse here discussed entitled *Daqā'iq al-Hurūf*,⁶⁶ where the same symbolism and concepts are used.⁶⁷ The term

65. 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, *Diwān al-Haqā'iq*, Cairo, 1889, p. 435. Cf., *Lings*, pp. 150-1.

66. Leiden, Cod. Or. 7643. See also A. Johns' edition and translation of this work in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, April and October, 1955, pts. I and II respectively, pp. 55-73, 139-58.

67. Cod. Or. 7643, p. 144.

ḥarf in the sense of 'verge' is expressed in the Qur'ān to convey the idea of people whose minds are not firm in their faith in God:

*Wa minā'l-nāsi man ya'budu'Llāha 'alā ḥarfīn...*⁶⁸

There are among men some who serve God, as it were, on the verge...

The last word in the first line of Ibnū'l-'Arabi's verse: *nuqal*, is not necessarily derived from the root *qwl*, in which case it would refer to the Creative Command or Word (*qawf*): 'Kun!', i.e. 'Be!' In that case the first line is to be read:

We were Lofty Letters unuttered,...

But Ḥamzah's translation of the word *nuqal* as *dipindahkan*, with variant concepts such as *berpindah* and *bergerak*,⁶⁹ suggests that *nuqal* there is derived from the root *nql*, conveying the basic meaning: 'to move, shift, or transfer from one place to another'. As I have pointed out earlier the Lofty Letters are the Divine 'Ideas' or Primordial Potentialities (*Istī'dād Aṣli*) in the Divine Knowledge, or they are also called the Fixed Essences (*al-A'yāmī'l-Thābitah*). When they 'actualize' themselves as 'external' existence at the instance of the Divine Command (*amr*) or Creative Word (*qawf*) 'Kun!' they do not and are not 'moved', 'shifted' or 'transferred' from their original Abode in 'the Highest Peaks' of the Divine Knowledge; rather, it is their 'projection' or 'reflection' that constitutes their 'actualization' as 'external' existence. The terms 'projection' and 'reflection' imply the concept of the double-faced mirror which the Ṣūfis use to explain their cosmological doctrine respecting the Fixed Essences. In fact, Ḥamzah himself is very much aware of that concept, and it is therefore logical that he should compare the Fixed Essences to a Mirror (*nir'ār*) reflecting the Lofty Letters above it and the Non-Beings (*'adamiyyāt*) below it:

A'yān Thābitah bukankah⁷⁰ Mir'ār?

Mengapa pulang dikata 'Adamiyyāt!

68. Qur'ān 22:11.

69. Cf., *Asrār*, pp. 36-7; *Muntahī*, p. 117.

70. The text has *bukankah*. But this could be the copyist's error, for the bar of the *kāf* in the suffix *kah* can easily be mistaken for a *fathah* to make the letter a *lām* instead of a *kāf*, hence reading: *lah*. *Bukankah* is in fact meant here.

Tatakala awwal bernama Hurūf ‘Āliyyāt
Olehnya janggal menjadi ḍalālat.⁷¹

To return to the *Baḥr al-Nisā’*—the last two lines in verse H above:

Jawharnya amat burhāna
Tiada bergerak dari Astana.

refer, then, to the Fixed Essences which are not ‘transferred’ from their Palatial Abode as has been explained. In fact, the word *jawhar* as referring to an essence or substance, the secret and true nature of a thing, is synonymous with the word ‘*ayn* (pl. *a’yān*).

Many terms in the *Baḥr al-Nisā’* coincide conceptually with those found in other poems by Ḥamzah. To take some random examples, we find such terms as *alat* or *alat senjata* conveying the sense of a complete or perfect set of apparatuses. The term quite logically refers to another term: *muda*, meaning youthful, vigorous, virile in the sense in which the term *rajul* or *rijāl* is meant. Correspondingly, the term *alat (senjata)* is also applied to youthful women in the same sense as explained above, reciprocating its use with reference to youthful men. Thus in *Shā’ir Ḥamzah*:

Akan *orang muda* kasih akan *alat*
Jawhar nin mulia sungguh pun sangat
Akan ‘ilmu Allāh hendak kau per dapat
Mangkanya sampai pulangmu *rāḥat*.⁷²

And in the *Baḥr al-Nisā’*:

Baḥr al-Nisā’ yang sempurna ni‘mat
Dalamnya lengkap dengan sekalian *alat*
Airnya bernama Zamzam yang amat ladhḍhat
Memenuhi⁷³ chita, hati dan fu‘ād.⁷⁴

71. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 34.

72. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 51. See also Cod. Or. 3374, p. 12. In the Djakarta ms. containing some of Ḥamzah’s *shā’irs*, the verse appears on p. 43 (ML83. *Museum Pusat*, Djakarta). Cp. the term *jawhar* in line 2 with the interpretation given above.

73. Doorenbos leaves a blank space; he conjectures the word to read: *membuat* (Doorenbos, p. 65, and note 1), but it is in fact clearly as above, Cod. Or. 2016, p. 63.

74. *Loc. cit.*

And again in the same place:

Laut Nisā' sedia terperi
Kepada suatu falaq tujuh negeri;
Tujuh lapis kota Qudrati
*Alat senjata hadir menanti.*⁷⁵

Another example is the term *Khātam al-Nahiyīn* which occurs several times in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* and found also in Ḥamzah's *sha'irs* serving closely related or even identical conceptual spheres. The poetic expression: *Karangnya tajam seperti tombak* in line 2 of the third verse in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is also found in Ḥamzah's *Sha'ir Perahu* in line 3 of the seventh verse there, and is not found—as far as I know—in any verse written by any other poet (if any) of the same period (i.e. during Shāh 'Ālam's reign).

The concept of the finality of gnosis in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* couched in terms of earthly love is one which is familiar to Ṣūfīs. Jalālu'l-Dīn Rūmī (672/1374), "the greatest Ṣūfī poet of Persia," says that:

Woman is a ray of God: she is not the earthly beloved.
She is creative: you might say she is not created.⁷⁶

'Sweeping aside the veil of form,' says Nicholson commenting on the verse above, "the poet beholds in woman the eternal Beauty, the in-

75. Doorenbos' arrangement of this and numerous other verses is incorrect and garbled, which fact demonstrates repeatedly my contention that because Doorenbos mishandled the texts, the texts themselves suffer accusations of doubt as to their authenticity. This is what I mean when I refer earlier to the paradox that in spite of the orientalist scholars' recognition of Doorenbos' failings, the latter has yet succeeded by his ineptitude in insinuating doubts and confusion in their minds which they ought to have equally recognized as erroneous and false. See above, p. 7. Doorenbos' arrangement of the above verse reads:

Laut nisā' sedia terperi
kepada suatu falaq tujuh negeri
tujuh lapis kota qudrat alat senjata
hādir menanti tujuh lapis kotanya itu
empat pintunya amat tertentu
keempatnya itu ada bertemu
tawāflah disana 'ārif yang tahu.

The word *qudrat* above should and *does* in the text read: *qudratī* clearly to rhyme with *terperi*, *negerī* and *menanti*. The next verse should begin with: *Tujuh lapis kotanya itu*, etc.

76. *Mathnawī*, edited and translated into English by R.A. Nicholson, 2v., London, 1926, I, 2431.

spirer and object of all love, and regards her, in her essential nature, as the medium through which that Beauty reveals itself and exercises creative activity."⁷⁷ The same idea is expressed by "the Sultān of the Lovers" 'Alī Abū'l-Wafā', a disciple of the great Arab Ṣūfī poet 'Umar ibnū'l-Fāriḍ (632/1235), whom Ḥamzah quotes in the *Muntahī*:⁷⁸

Kullu'l-wujūdi wujūduhu lā tushrikanna bihi'l-milāh
Fa idhā nazartā lahu bihi fa'sjud humāka fa lā junāh.

Literally:

Every being is His Being: do not make a partner between Him and the beautiful.

If thou seest Him through Him, then prostrate thyself there and no sin will be upon thee' (i.e. 'If you see Him in the beautiful through His Sight, then you may prostrate yourself before the beautiful one, and no sin will be upon you for doing so').

In the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*, the various stages of the 'marriage of the soul' are depicted and, naturally, the analogy of marriage brings along with it the term '*aqad*, i.e. (marriage) contract or law;

Tatakala berlayar di Laut Nisā'
 Dengan 'ilmu '*aqad* yang sempurna...⁷⁹

and:

'*Aqad* ini terlalu ṣādiq
 Kebajikannya pada 'ilmu tawfīq...⁸⁰

and again:

'*Aqad* ini amat ṣādiqīn
 Lenyapkan pada qaba qawsayn...⁸¹

In Malay, marriage and '*aqad* is expressed by the word *kawin*, a reference to which is found in a different verse of Ḥamzah conveying the same notion of mystical marriage as depicted in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*:

77. *Rūmī poet and mystic*, R.A. Nicholson, London, 1950, p. 44, note 3.

78. *Al-Muntahī*, Cod. Or. 7291 (III), p. 115.

79. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 96.

80. *Loc. cit.*

81. *Loc. cit.*

Berjalan kau rajin-rajin
 Menchari guru tahukan bāṭin
 Yogya kau tuntut jalan yang āmin
 Supaya dapat lekas kau *katwin*.⁸²

In several *Shā'irs* by Ḥamzah the term *qaba qawasyū* is used, and in no other known *shā'ir* of the period—not even in Shamsu'l-Dīn's *Dhikr Dā'irah Qāba Qawsayni au Adnā* previously mentioned—is similar usage found except in the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*, a fact which is significant in further determining its authorship.

As I have stated earlier, the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is also called the '*Ilm al-Nisā'*'. The term '*ilm*', then, is here synonymous with *baḥr*, and the fact that these two terms are synonymous, in the mystical context, again, most significantly, finds its first Malay expression in the writings of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī alone. The Sea or Ocean (*al-Baḥr*) is conceived by Ḥamzah as the best and most totally comprehensive analogy for the Divine Essence, Unique and Absolute.⁸³ He calls the analogy of the Sea and its Waves the *jamī'u'l-anthāl*⁸⁴—of all analogies the most total in its comprehensiveness. It is to this analogy that he repeatedly commends his readers when discoursing upon the nature of Absolute Being, whether in prose or in poetry. When the Essence Unique (*Dhāt Semata*) gazes upon Itself, as it were, It sees Itself together with all Its Predispositions (*shu'ūn*), and at that 'instant' the Seer is called the Knower (*al-'Ālim*), the Seen is called the Known (*al-Ma'lūm*), Seeing is called Knowledge (*al-'Ilm*). All three are in fact one and the same, only its names are different, for it is by virtue of Knowledge that the Knower and the Known acquire names and manifestation.⁸⁵ Hence the Sea or Ocean as an analogy of Absolute Being more properly speaking refers to the Divine Knowledge, the second attribute of the Unique Essence, and, as such, it pertains to the First Determination (*Ta'ayyun Awwal*) of Absolute Being.⁸⁶ Knowledge (*al-'Ilm*) is the 'Sea' (*laut*),⁸⁷ and viewed from another aspect it is also the Reality of Muḥammad, (*Ḥaqīqat*

82. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

83. *Asrār*, pp. 54: *Tidahu kita itu seperti Baḥr al-'Āmiq*, fol.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

86. *Sharāb*, Ch. V.

87. *Asrār*, pp. 35 fol. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 54-9.

Muhammad),⁸⁸ the *Logos* mentioned earlier.⁸⁹ It is already obvious from the start that the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is an allusion to the mystical union or marriage of the Seal of the Prophets ('*aqad Khātām al-Nabiyyīn*) symbolized by the Two Bow-Lengths (*Qāba Qawsayn*).⁹⁰ The '*Ilm al-Nisā'*' refers to the Finality of Gnosis attained to by the Prophet. Speaking of the Fourth Portal symbolized by the letter '*ayn*'⁹¹, the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* says:

Pintu itu jalan Rahasia
Itulah kesudahan jalan 'Ilm al-Nisā'...⁹²

i.e.:

That Portal is the Secret path
It is the ultimate path of the Knowledge of Women.

The words *kesudahan jalan* denote the *finality* of the mystical journey, and the term *rahasia* (Ar. *sirr*) denotes gnosis as quoted by Ḥamzah in the *Sharāb*,⁹³ where the Prophet is reported to have said: '*Al-ma'rifatu sirri*'—'Gnosis is my Secret.'

There is yet another important factor of great significance that must be brought forth in connection with the title of the poem as a whole. It seems to me no mere coincidence that the term *baḥr* is used for the title of the poem. Ḥamzah has written many other *sha'irs* which can be designated categorically as *baḥrī sha'irs*, since they are all called after the analogy of the Sea (of Absolute Being). They are, for example, each according to the particular aspect from which the Absolute is envisaged, the *Baḥr al-Buṭūn* (The Sea of the Innermost Depth);⁹⁴ *Baḥr al-Qadīm* (The Eternal Sea);⁹⁵ *Baḥr al-'Amīq* (The Deep or Fathomless Sea);⁹⁶ *Baḥr al-'Ulyān* (The Sublime Sea);⁹⁷ *Baḥr al-Ḥaqq* (The Sea of the

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–1.

89. See above, pp. 15–18.

90. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 96. See also above, pp. 13 fol., 25.

91. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 94: Keempat Pintu bernama '*Ayn*,
Maqām 'Ā'ishah Ummu'l-Mu'min[in].

92. *Loc. cit.*

93. Chapter IV.

94. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 82.

95. *Loc. cit.*

96. *Aṣṣār*, p. 54.

97. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 84.

Truth);⁹⁸ *Baḥr al-Laṭīf* (The Subtle Sea);⁹⁹ *Baḥr al-Dhannūb* (The Sea of Sins).¹⁰⁰ In the last mentioned, the term *dhanūb* (sins, the singular form: *dhanb*) refers to Imaginary or Illusory Existence (*wujūd wahmī*), i.e. the World together with all its parts, and Man from the point of view of his external manifestation (*diri yang zāhir*), and not from the point of view of his inner reality (*diri yang bāṭin*). This can be deduced from the very fact that both in the *Asrār* and in the *Muntahī* Ḥamzah quoted the well known line:

...*Wujūduka dhanbun lā yuqāsu bihi dhanbu*.¹⁰¹

The line comes from a verse quoted by Junayd al-Baghdādī (298/910) in Hujwārī's *Kashf al-Mahjūb*¹⁰² alluding to a saying of the woman saint of Baṣrah, Rābi'ah al-'Adawiyyah (185/801):

Idhā qultu mā adhnabtu qālat mujibatan
Ḥayātuka dhanbun lā yuqāsu bihi dhanbu

When I say: 'What is my sin?' she says in reply
'Thy existence is a sin with which no other sin can be compared.'

'It is said that Rābi'ah al-'Adawiyyah met one of the Gnostics and asked him of his state, and he replied: "I have trod the path of obedience and have not sinned since God created me," whereupon she said: "Alas, my son, thine existence is a sin wherewith no other sin may be compared."¹⁰³ In Ḥamzah's quotation *wujūduka* and *ḥayātuka* are synonymous terms, and 'sin' there refers to the 'secret polytheism' (*shirk al-khafī*)—the implied admission of duality of 'I' and 'Thou' conveyed in the assertion 'thine (my) existence'.¹⁰⁴ The term *baḥr*, as it appears conveying mystical connotation in Ḥamzah's *sha'irs*, is also given in Malay:

98. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

99. *Asrār*, p. 78.

100. See Cod. Or. 2016, p. 52.

101. See *Asrār*, p. 61; *Muntahī*, p. 118.

102. The oldest Persian treatise on Sūfism, translated from the text of the Lahore edition, compared with Mss. in the India Office and British Museum, by R.A. Nicholson, Leyden-London, 1911, p. 297.

103. Cf. *A Moslem saint of the twentieth century*, M. Lings, London, 1961, pp. 137-8.

104. See further, *Asrār*, pp. 60-1, 67.

Laut Silān (The Sea of Ceylon);¹⁰⁵ *Laut China* (The China Sea);¹⁰⁶ *Laut Qulzum* (The Red Sea);¹⁰⁷ *Laut Tawhīd* (The Sea of Divine Unity);¹⁰⁸ *Laut Bāqī* (The Enduring Sea);¹⁰⁹ *Laut Lāzim* (The Sea of Necessity [i.e. Inseparable from all]);¹¹⁰ *Laut Hayyū'l-Bāqī* (The Perpetually Living Sea);¹¹¹ *Laut yang Tiada Berupa* (The Formless Sea);¹¹² *Laut yang Maha 'Alī* (The Most Exalted Sea);¹¹³ *Laut yang Maha Berbangsa* (The Most Noble Sea);¹¹⁴ *Laut yang 'Alī* (The Sublime Sea);¹¹⁵ *Laut yang Sāfi* (The Sea of Purity);¹¹⁶ *Laut yang Garang* (The Turbulent Sea);¹¹⁷ *Laut yang Tiada Bersāhil* (The Shoreless Sea);¹¹⁸ *Laut Khāliq* (The Sea of the Creator);¹¹⁹ *Laut yang Tiada Berbagai* (The Sea without Compeer);¹²⁰ *Laut yang Halir* (The Ever-flowing Sea);¹²¹ *Laut Anta Faramāna* (The Sea of 'Thou art the Divine Decree')¹²²—and why not then also *Baḥr al-Nisā'* or *Laut Nisā'*?

The foregoing discussion on the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is by no means to be understood as intended to be an exposition of the poem; it is merely a brief and cursory survey aimed nonetheless—even at this stage—at demonstrating the reasonableness and truth of the contention that Ḥamzah was the author of the poem. Four important points, now emerging, at once demand such a conclusion:

1. Not only the conceptual system, but individual key words or mystical terminologies in Malay and Arabic that make up the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* tally exactly with the system and terminologies evident in the writings of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī;

105. Cod. Or. 3374, p. 26.

106. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 88.

107. Cod. Or. 3374, p. 26.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

109. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 86.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 76, 83.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

114. *Loc. cit.*

115. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

116. *Loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, p. 87.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 88.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 86.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

2. No other mystical poem written by any other poet displaying the same formal structure as the *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is ever found *except* in the poems of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī;
3. If any other such poet did exist during the period of Shāh 'Ālam, then surely that poet must have been well-known and well established to be able to write such a poem, and he must have written other works, or his name at least is remembered; and yet not one single reference to any poet of the period *except* to Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī is ever found, and references to Ḥamzah's *sha'irs*, when found, are found in the works of his disciples such as Shamsu'l-Dīn Pasai and others in the seventeenth century, and in the works of his critics such as Rānirī, who all were accustomed to quote him without ever indicating an iota of a clue as to the existence of other such *sha'irs* or poets then. The attempt at versification by Shamsu'l-Dīn himself can nowhere be compared with Ḥamzah's verses, so that it rules the former out as a possible author of the poem;
4. No other Malay mystical poet of the period—or perhaps even in later periods—has so abundantly made use of the analogy of the sea, has made so extensive use of the title *baḥr* or *laut* for poems or fragments of poems. In fact, I would like to assert here that the popularity of that analogy in later Malay mystical writing, to the extent that it became almost a standard analogy in the expression of a great part of mystical doctrine, is directly due to Ḥamzah's example and the posthumous dissemination and fame of his writings and teachings.


There seems to me to be no point at this stage in proceeding any further with the discussion on the authorship of the *Baḥr al-Nisā'*, for while I adduce many weighty points in support of my contention, Voorhoeve and those who agree with him, or on whose arguments his are based, have merely set down, after all is said and done, one weak fact to strengthen their doubt: that Ḥamzah is not mentioned in the poem or elsewhere as its author—and this 'dialogue' is not fair, for I begin to feel like the Picman in Simple Simon of the nursery rhymes. For me, with reference only to the Dialogue with the confronting enigmas of Malay literary history and Muslim cultural tradition, and not to the company of scholars who stand about perplexed at the Gordian Knots

they themselves have construed, it seems that many such knots will solve themselves only if cut by the sharp sword of natural reason. He who strives to seek the dazzling sun by the dim light of the candle in the desert will not find it!

It may be argued that, with reference to the four points outlined above, there is yet the riddle of two 'personages', ostensibly Šūfī poets like Ḥamzah, mentioned in the *sha'irs*, for me to unravel before my contentions couched in the four points can be considered to have achieved the degree of finality as absolute conclusions. The names Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl appear several times in *sha'irs* 'ascribed' to Ḥamzah that they have given rise to doubts as to the authorship of those *sha'irs* in which the names appear. Hence Voorhoeve speaks of 'anonymous poems of dubious origin' and 'verse in which the names of the authors, not Ḥamzah, are clearly stated'.¹²³ The glaring fact that those poems and verses in which the names of Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl occur are identical in terms of formal structure and conceptual content with all other poems and verses in which the name of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī also occurs does not seem to have struck that scholar's doubting mind as indicative of the clear solution that their significance lies in the fact that all those poems and verses are the product of one and the same man, namely Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī; and that the names Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl are *concepts* whose significance can be understood according to the conceptual context of the poems and verses in which they occur. What follows will be adduced as proofs to demonstrate the truth of my assertion that the names Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl are indeed what I have stated them to be as above, and that the name Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī may even be nothing more than a mere mistake for Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī! Now, in Cod. Or. 2016, the name Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī occurs four times.¹²⁴ In several places in the text of the manuscript, errors in transcription have been found in particular where the original letters which make up individual words resemble other letters in the Arabic alphabet, where many letters resemble one another and only dots distinguish one from the other. Hence a *jīm* (ج) may be written instead of a *hā'* (هـ), or a *fā'* (ف) instead of a *qāf* (ق); or in a

¹²³. See above, p. 7, and note 20.

¹²⁴. Pp. 28-9; 91-2.

slightly different case, a *lām* (ل) is written so that it looks like a *rā'* (ر) and is confused with it, *vice-versa*. The name *Ḥamzah* is made up of the letters *ḥā'* (ح), *mīm* (م), *zāy* (ز), *hā'* (ه)—the last letter written like the Arabic number 5 (٥), which represents its numerical value in the *abjad* (alphabet). The letter *hā'* when appearing as the first letter of a word is written thus: (هـ); as the middle letter thus: (ه) or (هـ); as the last letter, when joined to a middle letter thus (هـ), and when not joined to a middle letter, but standing alone thus (ه). The letter *zāy* (ز) in *Ḥamzah* can be joined to a preceding letter, but not to any after it; hence the final letter *hā'* (ه) there stands alone and is written as indicated above. The text is written in the cursive script, and in that script some letters, not carefully inscribed would often have been mistaken for others by scribes or copyists, so that a different but meaningfully possible word was inscribed where another was intended. Such, most definitely, seems to have been the case with the writing of the name *Ḥamzah* (حمزه) which in the cursive script of the text (and others as well) is invariably written with the curve of the tip of the *zāy* (ز) joined to the final *hā'* (ه) making a loop so that the two letters together, including the dot of the *zāy* (ز), can very easily be mistaken for a *nūn* (ن). Similarly, the loop which forms the letter *mīm* (م), if not clearly joined at the top, will most certainly cause it to be mistaken for a *sīn* in this case (س). Thus if the letters *ḥā'*, *mīm*, *zāy*, *hā'*, forming the name *Ḥamzah* are written in the manner found in the cursive script of the text thus: , which is so inscribed in the text, then it can very easily also be read to form another name: *ḥā'*, *sīn*, *nūn*—*Ḥasan*! Hence we get *Ḥasan* Fansūrī instead of *Ḥamzah* Fansūrī, and we are led to believe in the existence of another person when in fact that person's existence is merely the astonishing product of the imaginative mind born out of the careless error of another. And so it seems that a slip of the scribe's pen caused a slip of the copyist's sight which in turn chain-reactioned to a slip of the scholar's mind which has since decades past caused a serious slip in historiography pertaining to an important aspect of Malay literary history.

If the above account of the unravelling of the puzzle of *Ḥasan* Fansūrī is too ridiculous to be true, it is yet most probably true, and truth is sometimes ridiculously simple. Ridiculous because it has taxed the crudition of many a scholar and has plunged him into an academic

maelstrom in which he loses himself in ever-deepening confusion and doubt. Even if the above account were not true, whatever else there is to explain away the mystery of Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī must inexorably lead to Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī alone, as will be demonstrated in what follows.

If such a person as Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī really existed, he could still not have been the author of the poems or verses in question by virtue of what has been suggested earlier.¹²⁵ The relationship between Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī could well have been similar in kind, though not perhaps in degree, to that which existed between Shamsi Tabriz and Rūmī.¹²⁶ Speaking of Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī, one of the verses says:

Shaykh itulah yang terlalu kashfī,
Karāmatnya mashhūr pada sekalian negeri.¹²⁷

i.e.:

That Shaykh is indeed most gifted with intuitive perception,
His saintliness is famous throughout the land.

Now if, on the testimony of the above verse, his saintliness was *famous throughout the land*, how was it that—as far as we know from all available sources—there was absolutely no reference whatever to it or to him, or to traces of his existence?—except, that is, in Ḥamzah's verses where indeed, he must have been referring not to another person but to himself. The mere occurrence of names other than Ḥamzah's in his verses does not show that the verses could have been written by others, for many other names do occur there which refer to the Prophet, such as Aḥmad¹²⁸ and Abū'l-Qāsim¹²⁹ for instance; and those that refer to concepts in the ontological, cosmological and psychological doctrines of the Ṣūfīs, such as 'Abdu'l-Wāḥid,¹³⁰ which refers to the Universal Soul (*al-Nafsu'l-Kullīyyah*); 'Abdu'LLāh,¹³¹ which refers to the *faqīr* who has reached the stage of the Tranquil Soul (*al-Nafsu'l-Muṭma'innah*);

125. See above, the four points mentioned, pp. 29–30, and also, pp. 32 fol.

126. See *The Divāni Shamsi Tabriz*, edited and translated by R.A. Nicholson, London, 1953, Introduction.

127. Cod. Or. 2016, pp. 28–9.

128. Cod. Or. 3374, p. 12.

129. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 81.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

'*Abdu'l-Ḥamid*¹³² and, as I will show later, also '*Abdu'l-Jamāl*'.¹³³ The prefix '*abd*' (slave) in all the instances cited above refers to the effect (*āthār*) of the Divine Names (*al-Asmā'*) to which they are related as phenomenal manifestations of the latter.

Apart from the suggestion that the name *Ḥasan* Faṣṣūrī is a scriptural error for *Ḥamzah* Faṣṣūrī, the only other plausible explanation of the riddle of its occurrence in *Ḥamzah*'s writings seems to me to be the clear indication that *Ḥasan* denotes a particular mystical aspect of *Ḥamzah* Faṣṣūrī himself, which is also connected closely with the mystical concept of *Jamāl*. As all Muslims know, there are seven principal Attributes of God (*al-Ṣifāt*) whose logical order is given as (i) Life (*Ḥayāt*); (ii) Knowledge (*ʿIlm*); (iii) Will (*Irādah*); (iv) Power (*Qudrah*); (v) Speech (*Kalām*); (vi) Hearing (*Sam'*); and (vii) Sight (*Baṣar*).¹³⁴ According to the Ṣūfīs in particular the Divine Attributes are not other than the Divine Essence (*al-Dhāt*)—they are the Essence manifesting Itself under the aspect of 'externality'. The Essence, in one or other of Its infinite aspects, manifests Itself in the 'form' of the Divine Names. Attributes are therefore Divine Names manifested in the external world. There are two aspects of the Divine Names, the one opposed to the other, under the general heading of Beauty (*al-Jamāl*) and Majesty (*al-Jalāl*) and governed by Perfection (*al-Kamāl*). Each Name produces an effect (*athar*) and all the Names are in continuous operation, and no cessation of such operation is possible for any of them—as the Qur'ān says: *Kulla yawmin huwa fī shā'n*:¹³⁵ Every moment He is in some State (of Activity). The effects are therefore constantly changing,¹³⁶ each being annihilated and replaced by a similar set much in the same manner as waves are constantly made to appear and disappear on the ocean's face by the unseen forces that work in nature.¹³⁷ The dynamic Creative Activity, then, flows from the Divine Names that operate incessantly in the Divine Act of Self-Revelation (*tajallī*).¹³⁸ In this Act of Self-Revelation His particularizations (*takḥṣīs*) embrace all; the Beautiful as well

132. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

133. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 32, 33; 37, 38; 42, 43.

134. Cf., *Asrār*, pp. 23–24; 27–34; *Sharāb*, p. 19.

135. 55:29.

136. *Asrār*, p. 39.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 58; *Sharāb*, pp. 18, 20.

138. Cf., *Sharāb*, pp. 15–19.

as the Majestic, good and evil, the believer and the unbeliever. Hence His Name Most Compassionate (*al-Rahmān*), through which God out of His Mercy (*rahmat*) first brought forth the Universe, embraces all things and is also the sum of His Majesty, in contradistinction with His Name Most Merciful (*al-Rahīm*) through which He is particularized only in all that is Beautiful and good, particularly in the Prophets, the Saints and the Righteous.¹³⁹ Now the root form of the proper name *Hasan* (comely or beautiful) is *hasuna* (to a be comely or beautiful), and the noun form is *husn* (comeliness or beauty). According to the Ṣūfīs generally and to Jīlī in particular, *Jamāl* denotes—as explained above—Divine Beauty and *husn* its outward manifestation. In Jīlī's verse known as the '*Aynīyyah*' (verses ending with the letter '*ayn*'), the above idea is expressed thus:

Idhā qīla qul lā qultu ghayra jamālīhā
*Wa 'in qīla illā qultu husnuki shā'i'u.*¹⁴⁰

As I have explained above, every Divine Attribute has an effect (*athar*) in which its *Jamāl* or *Jalāl* or *Kamāl* is manifested. Thus *husn* (phenomenal beauty) is an effect of *Jamāl* (Absolute Beauty) and, in the same way as '*abd*' is to be conceived as analogous to *athar*, the proper name '*Abdu'l-Jamāl*' is in this sense synonymous, as it were, with *Hasan*, for *Hasan* is the outward effect of *husn*.

In the case of the name '*Abdu'l-Jamāl*', it occurs seven times in Cod. Or. 2016.¹⁴¹ In all cases, including that of the name *Hasan Fanṣūrī* already explained above, the name '*Abdu'l-Jamāl*' occurs in *sha'irs* entitled *Shā'ir Jāwī fī bayān 'Ilm al-Sulūk wa'l-Tawḥīd* which in another version in another manuscript is entitled *Shā'ir Ḥamzah*, indicating the fact that all *Shā'irs* bearing the title *Shā'ir Jāwī*...etc., are to be regarded as of Ḥamzah's authorship.¹⁴²

139. *Asār*, p. 40. See also my *Mysticism*, pp. 93–7, and the relevant notes in that section for a clarified exposition of the concept of the Divine Attributes and Names.

140. Cf., *Al-Insānī'l-Kāmil*, vol. 1, chapter 30: *On Divine Beauty*, pp. 89–91. A fragment of the '*Aynīyyah*' is found on p. 90. See also R.A. Nicholson's *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1921, p. 143.

141. See above, note 133. The verse in Cod. Or. 2016, p. 33 is the same as the one in *ibid.*, p. 38.

142. See above, p. 12, and notes 33–6.

Bearing in mind what I have just pointed out in connection with the close relationship between the mystical concept of *Jamāl* and those of the Divine Attributes (*al-Ṣifāt*), the Divine Names (*al-Asmā'*) and the Divine Acts (*al-Af'āl*) which produce the Divine Effects (*al-Āthār*), we may now see the significance of the opening lines in which the name 'Abdu'-Jamāl first occurs:

Aho segala kita yang ber'aqal- 'aqal!
 Shahādāt inilah perkataan yang tawal,
 Menyatakan *asmā' ṣifāt* dan *af'āl*,
 Demikianlah bayān faqīr 'Abdu'-Jamāl.¹⁴³

The whole poem then speaks of the essential unity of all the correlated mystical concepts and of the need for the Traveller on the Mystic Path to have gnosis of them.¹⁴⁴ Since 'Abdu'-Jamāl, being an effect of *ḥusn* which is the outward manifestation of *Jamāl*, refers to a creature who has in him the potentiality of attaining to his original nature, determined by his Primordial Potentiality (pl. *Istīdād Aṣlī*) which in this case flows from the Good or the Divine Beauty, it is clear that as creature, he is already 'separated', as it were, from his true nature, and in the process of separation he becomes one who is unaware and forgetful (*ghāfil*) of his real origin. As Mawlānā Jalālu'l-Dīn Rūmī says:

One who has lived many years in a city, so soon as he
 goes to sleep,
 Beholds another city full of good and evil, and his own
 city vanishes from his mind.
 He does not say to himself: "This is a new city: I am a
 stranger here";
 Nay, he thinks he has always lived in this city and was
 born and bred in it.
 What wonder, then, if the soul does not remember her
 ancient abode and birthplace,
 Since she is wrapt in the slumber of this world, like a
 star covered by clouds?—

143. Cod. Or. 2016, pp. 30-1.

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-2.

Especially as she has trodden so many cities and the dust
that darkens her vision is not yet swept away.¹⁴⁵

Hence in the next line in which *'Abdu'l-Jamāl* occurs, it is stated that:

'Abdu'l-Jamāl terlalu ghāfil¹⁴⁶—

'Abdu'l-Jamāl is most *unaware*.

The 'cities' mentioned in the last line of Rūmī's verse obviously refer to the planes of being or phases of experience (*ta'ayyun*) traversed by the soul in its descent (*tanazzul*) from the Real to the Phenomenal World and its subsequent return (*taraqqi*) from Plurality to Unity. In the next verse in which *'Abdu'l-Jamāl* occurs, the same notion, though more concise and less poetic, is expressed thus:

'Abdu'l-Jamāl hina dan karam

Terlalu waṣāl tatkala iḥrām

Pada sekalian ta'ayyun terlalu faham

Itulah jalan kesudahan kalām.¹⁴⁷

The verse alludes to the idea that *'Abdu'l-Jamāl*, the righteous soul in its phase of experience as man (hence *hina*: lowly, and *karam*: sunk in the contemplation of his Real Nature) realizes that when it was in its primordial state of purity (*iḥrām*) it was one or united with Real Being (*terlalu waṣāl*). The righteous soul is, in its state as man, most conversant with *all* the planes of being and phases of experience (*pada sekalian ta'ayyun terlalu faham*) since it has passed through all the stages. In Rūmī's verse quoted, the 'dust that darkens her vision' refers to the 'dust' of Phenomenal or Illusory Existence that becomes a veil (*ḥijāb*), as it were, preventing the soul from obtaining a vision of her true Nature. This idea is well known among the Ṣūfīs and an expression of this can be found, for example, in Ḥamzah's *Asrār*, where the People of the Path (*Ahlī'l-Sulūk*) are reported to have said:

Hijābu'l-Dhāt bi'l-Ṣifāt

Ḥijābu'l-Ṣifāt bi'l-Asmā'

145. *Mathnawī* IV, 3628; see also *ibid.*, 3637.

146. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 32.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 33. The same verse is repeated in *ibid.*, p. 38.

Hijābu'l-Asmā' bi'l-Af'āl
*Hijābu'l-Af'āl bi'l-Āthār.*¹⁴⁸

i.e.:

The Attributes are a veil concealing the Essence;
 The Names are a veil concealing the Attributes;
 The Acts are a veil concealing the Names;
 The Effects are a veil concealing the Acts.¹⁴⁹

The veil of Phenomenal or Illusory Existence, with respect to man and his soul, is also sometimes conceived by the Sūfis as constituting a kind of 'secret polytheism' (*shirk al-khafī*), since its affirmation consists in an affirmation of an existent other than God, Who should alone be realized as, and is in fact, the only Existent. Another term closely connected with the mystical concept of 'polytheism' (*shirk*) is that of 'unbelief' or, more properly speaking, 'the rejection as false what is in fact known to be true' conveyed in the term *kufṛ*, from which the active participle *kāfir* is derived. *Kufṛ* in its basic sense conveys the meaning 'to be covered', and what is covered is man's rational and intellectual faculty (*al-'aql*)—covered from a vision of the Truth (*al-Haqīqah*). Hence also, since both *shirk* and *kufṛ* are a sin (*al-dhanb*), Phenomenal or Illusory Existence, from the point of view of gnostics, constitute the greatest sin, for it is an impediment, a covering, a veil that conceals Real Existence. Thus Shaykh Muḥyi'l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī says, for example:

'Al-ma'rīfatu hijābun bayna'l-'ārif wa'l-ma'rūf.'

i.e.:

'Gnosis is a Veil between the Knower (i.e. the Gnostic)
 and the Known (i.e. the Object of Gnosis: God).'

and:

'Al-'ilmu hijābu'l-akbar.'

i.e.:

'Knowledge is the Greatest Veil'.

And this is also the meaning of Rābi'ah al-'Adawiyyah's saying that:

¹⁴⁸. *Asrār*, p. 72-3.

¹⁴⁹. See above, pp. 33-35. The Effects, Acts, Names and Attributes correspond each with a particular plane of being and phase of experience in the Divine Act of Self-Revelation.

'Thy existence is a sin with which no other sin can be compared,' mentioned earlier.¹⁵⁰

In the first two lines of the following verse, where 'Abdu'l-Jamāl next occurs, the idea expressed above is also evident:

'Abdu'l-Jamāl hamba yang mudhnibi
Diamnya di Rantau Teluk Bahāri
Disana banyak harimau melintangi
Olehnya karunia maka dapat mukhayyilānī.¹⁵¹

literally:

'Abdu'l-Jamāl is a slave who is a sinner
He dwells on the shores of the Dazzlingly Splendid
Bay....

The term *hamba* (slave) in the first line above is synonymous with the term 'abd already explained.¹⁵² The word *mudhnib* (sinner) is derived as an active participle of the noun *dhanb* (sin) whose connotation in the mystical context I have already explained as Phenomenal or Illusory Existence. The word *rantau* in the second line, which I have translated literally as 'shores', means the 'reach of a river', a 'foreign country', a 'settlement'; as a verb (*merantau*) it means 'to travel (in a foreign land)', 'to go abroad', 'to range', 'to emigrate in search of a living', 'to wander'. We should by now perceive the conceptual connection between the term *rantau* in the mystical sense and the term *gharīb* (stranger in a foreign land, or wanderer) which together with the Malay equivalent *dagang* Hamzah uses so often in his *sha'irs* to denote the mystic or gnostic who is in the stage of realization of his true and lofty origin as being identical with Real Existence (*Wujūd Haqīqī*) in the plane of the Fixed Essences (*al-A'yānu'l-Thābitah*).¹⁵³ It may be added further as an interesting and important point that the term *Rantau Orang* which occurs frequently in the *Sha'ir Dagang* previously mentioned¹⁵⁴ can be considered as having a conceptual relationship with the doctrine of the

150. See above, pp. 27-28.

151. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 42.

152. See above, p. 33.

153. A brief commentary on the nature of the Fixed Essences is given in *Mysticism* pp. 81-86.

154. See above, p. 8.

soul here outlined in brief. In fact another term, *Sayfal-Rijāl*, which has also been mentioned earlier,¹⁵⁵ can, if the first word is read with a *kasrah* instead of a *fathah*—i.e. *Sif al-Rijāl* instead of *Sayf al-Rijāl*, be taken as synonymous with *Rantau Orang*, meaning: 'The Shore of Men'.¹⁵⁶ Hamzah's prolific use of the analogy of the sea (*lau*) and the river (*sungai*), and things connected with these such as the bay (*teluk*) and the riverbank or edge or brink of a river (*tebing*)—which latter will presently be mentioned—is quite evident—together with related analogies such as the wave (*ombak*), the drop of sea water or the raindrop (*titik*), the foam (*buih*), the vapour (*asap*), the cloud about to burst (*awan*), the well or spring (*perigi*)—in his exposition of the ontological and cosmological doctrines of the Šūfīs. Moreover, the Šūfīs' preference for water as an apt analogy for the nature of Reality may well have been due to the direct influence of certain particular passages in the Qur'ān, one of them being:

*Wa ja'alnā minā'l-mā'i kulli shay'in ḥayyin.*¹⁵⁷

And We made from water every living thing.

Teluk Bahārī (Dazzlingly Splendid Bay) too, as I will now show, refers not to any earthly place, but to a mystical concept related to other such concepts, so that in our research we are confronted with a kind of spiritual 'topography', as it were, that draws its wealth of imagery and vision to a great extent from the eschatology of Islam. The word *bahār* denotes, in Arabic, anything splendid and beautiful. It is derived from the original form *bahara*, which means 'to glitter', 'shine', 'dazzle' or 'overwhelm'. In its persianized connotation *bahārī* refers to things vernal or belonging to the Spring. The verse which next follows tells us more about *Teluk Bahārī*:

155. See above, p. 17.

156. It may be said that this notion too fits in well with *Baḥr al-Nisā'*: Sea of Women (see further the previous discussion above, pp. 17 fol.).

157. 21:30. Furthermore, the allusion to water, symbolic or otherwise, abounds in the Qur'ān. Apart from seas, we also find rivers (*anḥār*) and springs and fountains such as *al-Kawthar*, *al-Salsabil* and *al-Tamīm* mentioned in the Qur'ān, the latter kind in particular in connection with Paradise and spiritual realities. For another significant passage relevant to the above exposition, see below, p. 42.

Teluk Bahārī terlalu 'ajabī,
 Disini bernama Bukit Juranggi;
 Jalannya itu terlalu sanī,¹⁵⁸
 Banyaklah disana sesat menjalani.¹⁵⁹

Literally:

The Dazzlingly Splendid Bay is most marvellous,
 There is there [a hill] called the Ravined Hill;¹⁶⁰
 The way to it is most resplendent
 Many who went there had gone astray.

What does *Bukit Juranggi* signify? The next verse explains:

Bukit Juranggi terlalu tinggi,
 Sungainya luas sangat mengelilingi;
 Disana indah tiada terperi,
 Olehnya itulah menchengangkan budd[h]i.¹⁶¹

Literally:

The Ravined Hill is extremely high,
 Its rivers are wide and all-surrounding;
 There the splendour cannot be described,
 Such that it bewilders the Intellect.

The description of the 'Hill' as towering to a great height must mean that it refers not to a hill, but a mountain. The Mountain is here envisaged as having breathtaking Ravines, and it is surrounded by a vast expanse of water, all of which presents a vision that defies description and renders the Mind agape with astonishment. There can be no doubt, it seems to me, that the towering Mountain and all its splendour sym-

158. Doorenbos, for no apparent reason, has read *sunyi* for the letters *sīn—nūn—yā'* (not doubly-dotted below) which appears in the manuscripts (see Doorenbos, p. 85). Moreover, in the manuscript the letters are vocalized to read *sanī* (Cod. Or. 2016, p. 42), which means 'high', 'splendid', 'exalted', 'sublime'; derived from the original form (*sanā*) which conveys the meaning: 'to gleam', 'shine', 'radiate', 'flash', 'sparkle', 'glare' (of lightning). In fact in the above verse the meaning of *sanī* corresponds with *bahārī*.

159. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 42.

160. The word *jurang* in Malay denotes a channel worn by running water on a mountain side. Hence it also denotes a water course. The word *bukit* means 'hill', but in fact what should be envisaged here is not a hill, rather a mountain, as the next verse following the one above will show.

161. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 42.

bolizes the Divine Throne (*al-'Arsh*), and the waters surrounding it, giving the impression of it rising sheer above the waters, are the Heavenly, Waters (*al-Mā'*) over which, or on which, stands the Throne, as the Qur'ān says:

*Wa huwa'l-ladhi khalaqa'l-samāwāti
wa'l-arḍa fī sittati ayyāmīn wa kāna
'arshuhu 'alā'l-mā'*¹⁶²

And He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in
Six Days—and His Throne is over the Waters—

In this connection we may recall Ibnū'l-'Arabī's verse about the Lofty Letters (*Ḥurūf 'Aliyāt*), where he says:

We were Lofty Letters yet unmoved
Attached to our Abode in the Mountain Peaks
I wast thou within It, and we wert thou and thou He
Everything is in 'He is He'—ask of those in Union.¹⁶³

The Mountain the poet speaks of, in whose sublime heights (*dhurāt*: summits; *qulal*: peaks) the Primordial Potentialities (*Istīdād Aṣli*) in the form of the Fixed Essences (*al-A'yānu'l-Thābitah*) subsist, symbolizes the Divine Throne (*al-'Arsh*) which represents an aspect of the Divine Knowledge (*al-'Ilm*). The Throne of God, cosmologically transposed, corresponds to the Second Descent (*tanazzul*) corresponding with the Second Determination (*ta'ayyun*), in which 'stage' of the Revelation of the Essence to Itself (*tajallī*) no differentiation exists between Creator and creatures; so that the 'creatures' exist 'synthetically' and no duality or multiplicity is known among them. This is suggested clearly in the last two lines of the above verse.

The Throne is also conceived of as the 'seat of power' of The Most Compassionate One (*al-Raḥmān*), as the Qur'ān says:

*Al-Raḥmānu 'alā'l-'arshi' stawā.*¹⁶⁴

The Most Compassionate One is established on the
Throne (of power).

162. 11:7.

163. See above, pp. 19 fol.

164. 20:5.

The Most Compassionate One, through His Mercy (*al-Rahmat*) bestows existence to the world together with all its parts.¹⁶⁵ The Divine Names *al-Rahmān* and *al-Rahīm* (The Most Merciful One) each is the sum of the Divine Majesty (*al-Jalāl*) and the Divine Beauty (*al-Jamāl*) respectively. In the Divine Act of Self-Revelation, His particularizations (*takhsīṣ*) embrace all; the Beautiful as well as the Majestic, good and evil, the believer and the unbeliever. Hence *al-Rahmān*, as the Bestower of existence to the Universe together with all its parts, is the sum of His Majesty, in contradistinction with *al-Rahīm* Who is particularized only in all that is Beautiful and good, particularly in Prophets, Saints and the Righteous. But *al-Rahmān*, being that aspect of the Divine Name that is universal in Its particularization, embraces also the sum of all Attributes of Beauty, as Ḥamzah says in the *Asrār*:

Adapun Jamāl hukumnya daripada sifat
Rahīm, tetapi tiada bercherai dengan Rahmān yang
qadīm.¹⁶⁶

Divine Beauty is from the Attributes of the Most Merciful, but It is not 'separate' [i.e. distinct] from the Most Compassionate, Who is Eternal.

We now see that the Throne, which is the 'seat' of *al-Rahmān*, is also the sphere of operation, as it were, of the Divine Attributes of Beauty: *al-Jamāl*. I have also pointed out earlier that the Throne, conceived as the 'stage' of the Second Descent and Determination of the Essence in Its revelation to Itself, symbolizes ontologically that plane of being or existence wherein the creatures are individualized as a unity without any differentiation—as a general concept—(*ijmālī*), as it were, in the Divine Knowledge. It is significant that terms like *ijmālī* and *mujmalī*, referring to the ontological and cosmological planes of synthetical existence, convey a conceptual connection with the term *jamāl*, being derived, as it were, from the same root: *jamala*.

We have now identified the Lofty Mountain (*Bukit Juranggi*) rising sheer above the Dazzlingly Splendid Bay (*Teluk Bahāri*) as the Divine

165. See Qur'ān 40:7; 55:1-3; *Asrār*, pp. 40, 46-7.

166. Page 48. My commentary and interpretation of Ḥamzah's concepts of the Divine Names and Attributes is given in *Mysticism*, pp. 93-7. See especially pp. 95-7.

Throne (*al-'Arsh*) where The Most Compassionate One (*al-Rahmān*), in Whom is imbued the sum of all Attributes of Majesty (*al-Jalāl*) and Beauty (*al-Jamāl*), holds sway. Now if we imagine this Mountain as rising sheer above the Bay and the Waters surrounding it, then we must envisage it rising high above the waters as it were a Pillar with the Bay as its Base. This Base can be called, in Arabic, *kursī*, which is also what it means; but it should be clear that the reference here is to the mystical *al-Kursī*, the eschatological Footstool under the Divine Throne, which also corresponds to the Third Determination of the Essence, which 'stage' is the plane of analytical existence, where the creatures are made to exist analytically as potential existents or 'exterior essences' (*al-a'yānu'l-khārijīyyah*).¹⁶⁷ Whereas the Throne is the sphere of *al-Jamāl*—the Absolute Beauty—it is logically so that the Footstool, being the next sphere of existence from the Throne, should be the sphere of '*Abd al-Jamāl*', the prefix '*Abd*' there being 'derived', so to speak, from *al-Jamāl*. Moreover, from the *Kursī* downwards, the descent of the Absolute to the realm of the Relative, the World of Phenomena, the distinction between Creator and creatures has already occurred, and hence, again, the prefix '*Abd*' already signifies the creaturely nature. From the point of view of Relative Being, the World of Phenomena, however, the attainment to the spiritual degree of slavehood, in the true sense of the term signified by '*abd*', is seen as an ascent of the soul of the man thus signified to be reintegrated in the Spirit—its true nature and lofty Origin. This idea is also expressed in the next verse:

'Abdu'l-Jamāl [43] Orang yang Bujang
Membuangkan diri tiada sayang
Tempatnya da'im di Tebing Orang
Buayanya banyak tamengnya karang.¹⁶⁸

'Abdu'l-Jamāl is a Single Man
Who is not averse to casting away his self
His abode is ever at the Steep Bank of Humanity
Infested with crocodiles and guarded by sharp rocks.

167. For Hamzah's conception of Being as having three planes, see my *Mysticism*, pp. 155–6.

168. *Cod. Or.* 2016, pp. 42–3.

The word *bujang* in the first line means single, solitary, celibate, and it clearly refers to the servant of God who has succeeded in effacing his illusory phenomenal self and gained higher selfhood, where no duality exists. The second line confirms this interpretation. The word *bujang* also conveys the meaning of being free to marry, and in the above context, the marriage meant is the marriage of the soul with God, hence conveying the mystical sense of the term *rajul* which we have discussed earlier.¹⁶⁹ *Tebing Orang* refers to the Brink of Humanity—that point or stage in the plane of existence that ‘lies’ between the Worlds of Divinity (*Lāhūt*) and Humanity (*Nāsūt*).¹⁷⁰ The last line simply shows that the pilgrim’s progress is arduous and fraught with danger.

Two other verses in which ‘*Abdu’l-Jamāl*’ occurs convey mystical connotations. In the first two lines of one of them:

‘*Abdu’l-Jamāl* orang yang mudhnibi
Diamnya di Rantau Tebing Tinggi...’¹⁷¹

‘*Abdu’l-Jamāl* is a man who is a sinner
He dwells on the Shores of the High Bank...

the term *mudhnib* in the first line and its mystical connotation has already been explained.¹⁷² Similarly, in the second line *Tebing Tinggi* or the *High Bank* needs no further elaboration as it seems to correspond with *Tebing Orang* explained above. In the first two lines of the other one the reference to *Perigi Putat*—the ‘Well [or Spring, or Fountain] of the *Putat* Tree’—is problematic:

‘*Abdu’l-Jamāl* orang yang ghaflat
Diamnya di Rantau Perigi Putat...’¹⁷³

‘*Abdu’l-Jamāl* is one who is plunged in unawareness
He dwells on the Shores of the Spring of the *Putat* Tree...

169. See above, pp. 17 fol.

170. For further explanation on the categorization of the mystical worlds referred to, please consult my *Mysticism*, p. 156, notes 50–1. The ‘point’ or ‘stage’ referred to above encompasses several mystical worlds.

171. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 43.

172. See above, pp. 27–28, 37–38.

173. Cod. Or. 2016, p. 43.

Nevertheless, what is problematic is not the identity of 'Abdu'l-Jamāl, but the significance of the Spring or Fountain of the *Putat* Tree. It is certain that like the others the verse serves a mystical context. The mystical connotation of the term *ghaflat*, which has occurred before in another form: *ghāfil*, has already been explained,¹⁷⁴ and need not deter us here.

It seems to me that before any valid idea can be formed or even conjectured as to what the 'Spring of the *Putat* Tree' alludes to, it is necessary first to have some idea of the nature of the *putat* tree. This tree belongs to the myrtaceae family and is found spread over a wide area of Southeast Asia. The species in question are numerous and they all come under the botanical name of *Barringtonia*. There is a species in Java called *Planchonia Valida* which grows to great heights and sizes spread all over the island in country five hundred to one thousand meters above sea level. The *putat* tree, in height and size, covers a wide range from moderate to lofty heights and great sizes. In Sumatra, for example, it can be found along the sandy shores of the sea. In general, the tree has a preference for quiet rivers on the banks, and on the sea-face. The leaves of some of them are wide and big and their flowers beautiful and exotic. Generally too, the leaves, bark and fruit and sap of the tree are used internally and externally for medicinal purposes; for ailments such as stomach ache and colic-opthalmia and skin diseases. The fruits are also used to intoxicate fish. It is generally believed when taken internally that the medicinal properties of the *putat* produce a cooling effect. The wood is used, in some cases for building houses, in others for firewood. The name *putat* is used equally in Malay, Sundanese and Javanese.¹⁷⁵

From the above general summary of the characteristics of the *putat* tree, certain significant and salient points which characterize the tree universally may be drawn: it is generally not a small tree; it has big leaves affording cool shade; it is found near the water; its edible parts

174. See above, pp. 35 fol.

175. For details of the *putat*, of which the above is a general summary, see further, *A dictionary of the economic products of the Malay Peninsula*, by I. H. Burkill, with contributions by W. Birtwistle, F.W. Foxworthy, J.B. Scrivenor, and J.G. Watson, 1966, vol. 1, (A-H), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pp. 306-9; vol. 2 (I-Z), p. 1797; *Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 3, ed. D.G. Stibbe, with the collaboration of W.C.B. Wintgens, and E.M. Uhlenbeck; The Hague and Leiden, 1919, p. 145; *idem*, vol. 1, compiled by J. Paulus, The Hague and Leiden, 1917, p. 173; R.J. Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary*, Mytilene, 1932, pt. II, p. 292.

possess cooling properties. Most significant to our purpose is that it is found generally near the water and provides cool shade and substances having cooling properties, and these facts have now made it possible for a reasonable conjecture on the significance of *Perigi Putat*—The Spring or Fountain of the *Putat* Tree—to be set forth with confidence.

Jilī, in his book *Al-Insānu'l-Kāmil*, has pointed out that just as Hell is a mirror of absolute Majesty or *Jalāl*, so is Paradise a mirror of absolute Beauty or *Jamāl*.¹⁷⁶ Ḥamzah, speaking about the corresponding opposition between the roles of absolute Majesty and absolute Beauty, compared the former to the left hand, and the latter to the right hand.¹⁷⁷ Now in the 56th chapter of the Qur'ān we find the following significant passages:

Wa aṣḥābu'l-yamīni
mā aṣḥābu'l-yamīni
fī sidrin makhḍūdin
wa ṭalḥin mandūdīn
wa ṣillīn mandūdīn
*wa mā'in maskūbin...*¹⁷⁸

The Companions of the Right Hand,—
 What will be the Companions of the Right Hand?
 (They will be) among Lote-trees without thorns
 Among *Ṭalḥ* trees with flowers (or fruits) piled one
 above another,—
 In shade long extended,
 By water flowing constantly...

The Companions of the Right Hand are the Righteous dwellers of Paradise (*al-Jannah*) which is the mirror of absolute Beauty (*al-Jamāl*). They are the True Servants (*'ibād*, sing. *'abd*) of God, as other passages in the Qur'ān show, for example, with reference to the 'Tranquil Soul' (*al-Nafsu'l-Muṭma'innah*):

176. Vol. I, Chapters 23, and 24 pp. 89-94.

177. Pada Suatu 'ibārat, kedua tangan itu ya'nī Jamāl dan Jalāl; Jamāl mital kanan, Jalāl mital kiri. Sekalian yang baik menjadi dari kanan, sekalian yang jahat menjadi dari kiri.—*Asrar*, p. 48.

178. 27-31.

*Yā ayyatuhā'l-nafsu'l-muṣṭma'imnatu irjī' i
ilā rabbiki rāḍiyatan marḍīyyatan fa'l-dkhlūlī
fī 'ibādī wa'l-dkhlūlī jannatī.*¹⁷⁹

(To the Righteous Soul will be said:)
O thou Tranquil Soul!
Return thou to thy Lord,—
Well-pleased (thymself),
And well-pleasing
Unto Him!
Enter thou, then,
Among My true servants!
Yea, enter thou
My Paradise!

and again with reference to the Righteous (*al-Abrār*):

*Inna'l-abrāra yashrabūna min ka'sin
kāna mizājuhā kāfūran 'aynan
yashrabu bihā 'ibādu'Llāhi...*¹⁸⁰

As to the Righteous,
They shall drink
Of a Cup
Tempered with Camphor,
A Fountain where
The True Servants of God
Do drink...

Among the Ṣūfīs the epithet '*abd*', as pointed out earlier,¹⁸¹ is only used for those who have spiritually attained to the rank of the true Devotees of God. '*Abdu'l-Jamāl*', then, can refer to a dweller of Paradise, who is among those referred to as being the Companions of the Right Hand (*Aṣḥābu'l-Yamīn*) and the Righteous (*al-Abrār*). The significance of the *Putat* tree in Ḥamzah's verse, with emphasis on the cool shade which it affords, could well be analogous to the *Sidrah* or Lote-tree of Paradise.

179. 89:27-30.

180. 76:5-6.

181. See above, pp. 33, 35, 38, 43.

Indeed, the letters of the word *putat*,¹⁸² when computed according to the numerical values in the Arabic alphabet (*ahjad*) add up to 886,¹⁸³ which in turn converted to another word reads: *ḡād* (800), *fā'*, (80), *wāw* (6), giving *ḡfū*, which is the root of the word *ḡafā*, meaning 'abundance', 'overflowing' or 'copiously flowing' (with reference to water in a well, fountain or river). *Perigi Putat*, considered in this light, can mean 'The Copiously Flowing Fountain', which ought to bring to mind the Paradisal Fountain of Abundance known as *al-Kawthar*. The Qur'ānic term 'ayn or spring or source of water from which the true servants of God do drink (*yashrabu bihā'ibādu' Llāh*), whose water flows copiously and constantly (*mā'in maskūbin*), can be represented in Ḥamzah's verse as *Perigi Putat*. The *putat* considered as a tree that has been earlier compared, in virtue of its size and the cool shade its leaves afford, with the Paradisal Lote-tree which affords 'shade long extended' (*ẓillin mandūdīn*), can also be considered as analogous, in virtue of the cooling properties provided by its edible medicinal substances, with the cooling and medicinal properties of camphor (*kāḡūr*), which in the Qur'ānic context refers to the spiritually purifying Drink of the Righteous (*yashrabūna min ka'sin kāna mīzājūhā kāḡūran*).

Finally, there is still one point to clarify which if ignored might cause confusion. Since I have pointed out that 'Abdu'l-Jamāl as a mystical concept can also refer to a soul in paradise, how is it that the term *ghāfil* and *ghaflah*, which usually denotes the state of the unbeliever or the self veiled from the truth, can still be applied and is conceived as applicable to that soul? The answer to this is that according to the Sūfīs, the 'abd, the soul in paradise, can still be veiled by forgetfulness of God, which prevails after death over those in the Intermediate State (*al-Barzakh*), those in the place of Judgement (*al-Maḡshar*), those in Hell and Paradise until God reveals Himself to them on the Hill to which the inhabitants of Paradise go forth and behold Him.¹⁸⁴

This *Concluding Postscript* sets as its aims the clarification of lingering

182. Spelled: *fā'* (for *pā'*), *wāw*, *tā'*, *tā'*.

183. I.e.: *fā'* (80), *wāw* (6), *tā'* (400), *tā'* (400).

184. See *Insānu'l-Kāmil* II, p. 41. See also the 57th Chapter: On Thought (*Fī'l-Khayāl*). See further above, pp. 36–38. Consider the saying of the People of the Path on the Veils, also the reference to 'Abdu'l-Jamāl as *nukhayyilān*. It is also significant, I think, that Jīlī should refer to the Hill (*al-Jabal*), which might be analogous to the idea of the *Bukit* in Ḥamzah's context here treated.

obscurities, the banishment of nagging doubts and the unravelling of specific problems pertaining to Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī and the creative role he played in the invention and origination of the Malay *sha'ir* already proposed in another book; obscurities and doubts that had apparently still demanded exposition *a posteriori*. The foregoing exposition is not in the least intended to represent an exhaustive exposition and full commentary of the various meanings hidden in the texts of the verses treated, but is rather a demonstration which serves to fulfil the aims of the *Postscript*. To that end, I feel that at this stage its aims have been fulfilled, the proofs that it adduces have been sufficient, the clarification achieved and the doubts—I hope—dispelled. There can be no more reasonable conclusion to arrive at—it seems to me—than that the poem entitled *Ikāt-Ikatan 'Ilmu'l-Nisā'* or *Baḥr al-Nisā'* is of Ḥamzah's authorship; that the names Ḥasan Faṣṣūrī and 'Abdu'l-Jamāl refer either to one and the same person Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, or to a mystical concept pertaining to the Ṣūfī doctrine of the soul's ascent back to God; that, finally, Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī—it must be reaffirmed—was the inventor and originator of the Malay *sha'ir*.

EPILOGUE

The book entitled *The Origin of the Malay Sha'ir* and this *Concluding Postscript* to that book seek to point out yet another perhaps more fundamental problem besetting particularly Western Orientalist scholarship touching upon no less than the theory of knowledge itself. The works of the Dutch Orientalist scholars analyzed in this and the other book are indeed to be regarded as representative methodological demonstrations of the generally identical intellectual attitude in the quest for knowledge; an attitude towards knowledge that seems to me, a Muslim scholar, a peculiarity not solely restricted to them and other Orientalists, but typical of the Western attitude in general. This attitude towards knowledge seems to be the logical outcome of the percolation of conflicting ideas and values of the philosophies and cultures of ancient Greece and Rome, and the beliefs and dogmas of the theologies and doctrines of Christianity, altogether reflecting an all-pervasive dualistic world-view locked in despairing combat. Dualism abides in all aspects of Western philosophy: the speculative, the social, the political,

the cultural—just as it pervades with equal inexorableness the Western religion.

The spirit of Western culture is neither wholly scientific nor yet aesthetic in nature: it is both at once; it is modern and yet also at the same time mediaeval and classical; it is a tragic marriage of two conflicting elements, two opposing values that can never be reconciled harmoniously into a single whole. To put it in the Islamic religious terminology, Western culture reflects *shirk* as opposed to *tauhid*. What is the essence, the spirit of the Western *weltanschauung*? It originated with disenchantment towards religion and is basically generated in a state of doubt and inner tension; the inner tension is the result of the clash of conflicting elements and opposing values in the sustained dualism, while the doubt maintains the state of inner tension. The state of inner tension in turn produces the insatiable desire to seek and to embark on a perpetual journey of discoveries. The quest insatiable and the journey perpetual because doubt ever prevails, so that what is sought is never really found, what is discovered never really satisfies its true purpose. It is like the thirsty traveller who at first sincerely sought the water of knowledge, but who later, having found it plain perhaps, proceeded to temper his cup with the salt of doubt so that his thirst now becomes insatiable though he drinks incessantly, and that in thus drinking the water that cannot slake his thirst, he has forgotten the original and true purpose for which the water is sought. What Muslims would regard as fundamental truths become—in such a scheme of things—mere theories. Absolute values are denied and relative values affirmed. Nothing can be certain, in matters which matter, except the certainty that nothing can be certain. The logical consequence of such a world-view is philosophically to deny God and the Hereafter and affirm man and his world. Man becomes God and his world is his sole preoccupation, so that his own immortality consists in the continuation of his species and his culture in this world.¹⁸⁵ What is called 'progress' in all its aspects as far

185. Already Western historians of Asia are busily engaged, it would seem, now that there seems to be a fear of Western civilization forfeiting its place to the older civilizations of Asia which are showing signs of revival, in prematurely formulating and recording the presumed achievements of the West in Asia in the hope, perhaps, that since the Asians themselves are not so engaged in recording *their* achievements, the future history of the world will at least be Western dominated intellectually and thus secure its 'immortality'!

as the West is concerned is the result of the insatiable quest and perpetual journey spurred on by doubt and inner tension. The context in which the notion of progress is understood is always this-worldly, presenting a materialistic world-view that can be termed as a kind of humanistic existentialism.

The spirit of Western culture is like the Camusian Sisyphus who, like Sophocles' Oedipus, desperately hopes that all is well. I say *desperately hopes* that all is well because I suspect that the fact cannot be that all is well, for I believe that he can never really be happy in that state. The pursuit of knowledge, like the pursuit of the Stone from the plains to push it up the slope of the Mountain where at the top it is destined to roll down again, becomes a kind of serious game, never ceasing, as if to distract the soul from the tragedy of unattainment. No wonder, then, that in Western culture tragedy is extolled as being among the noblest values in the drama of human existence!

The quest for knowledge as a kind of serious *game* emphasizes in the Western scholar the character of the *homo ludens* which dominates the *homo sapiens* in him. Such an attitude towards knowledge produces the sceptic, never satisfied even in his own scepticism, and never ceasing to be one, so that it seems to defeat the very purpose of knowledge. Perhaps this attitude is well illustrated in the anguished cry of the ancient poet whose translated lines I chanced to read many years ago and which I now quote from memory:

Be mine!—to partial views no more confin'd,
Nor sceptic doubts the truth illumin'd mind;
For long deceived yet still on truth intent,
Life's waning years in wand'rings wild are spent.
My restless thought the same high quest essays,
Yet still the One and All eludes my gaze!

While yet on truth intent, the *possibility* of attaining to the truth—like what the Sophists held—is denied because of the sceptic doubts. Socrates, who needed truth had to disagree with the Sophists, but even he had to content himself only with the possible knowledge of the truth in human relations, of ethics alone, and not of religious truths on which he took the stand of the Sophists. Be that as it may, the generality of Western scholars now seem to have reaffirmed the Sophists' position *in*

toto for even concerning knowledge of the truth in human relations such as history they have espoused uncertainty and much doubt on the possibility of attaining to the truth positively. At the same time they demand the fulfillment of the criterion of absolute certainty *before* they can make any positive claim to knowledge though, paradoxically, they *begin* their research with an attitude that absolute certainty is unattainable, so that in their deliberations their conclusions are never positive. This erroneous *methodological* approach to knowledge, this fallacious *attitude*, instead of being admitted as simply contradictory—which is what it is—has even been intellectually exalted to claim sophisticated regions of profundity as being one of those philosophical antinomies which continually bewilders the human intellect. There seems to be an intellectual abhorrence for simple truth, but that simplicity must needs be first made complex and sophisticated before it can possibly be deemed to attain to the dignity of truth. Thus problems are created where there were none, except the created problems themselves, so that before one can demonstrate the truth, one must first demonstrate the non-existence of the created problems, a ridiculous feat which invariably consumes time and space and futile energy; and it is the unravelling of these problems that are now regarded as scholarship and attainment of knowledge! It is as the Qur'ān says: (10:32):

Fa mā dhiā ba'da'l-ḥaqqi illā 'l-dalāl—

And what is there beyond truth but error?—

and it was Jesus, I think, who said in emulation of simplicity that we must be like children in order to enter heaven. Scholars now seem to love complexity, perhaps because it assures them of something to do and claim, for in complexity there is the joy of the unravelling, and withal the opportunity to exhibit the worthiness of the scholarship.

It has been argued by some that doubt is the beginning of philosophy; that doubt is the key to intellectual progress which opens the door of the threshold of knowledge. But what kind of doubt? The question is prompted because it seems to me that we must distinguish between the doubt that leads to philosophy and intellectual progress, and the doubt that ultimately leads to intellectual stagnancy and is the ultimate source of all errors. Theaetetus, in one of Plato's dialogues bearing the

same title, says that knowledge is *true belief* when answering Socrates' question as to what is knowledge. In our age, when much interest is shown in classifying the various methods of knowledge, the American philosopher Peirce, who derived much influence from Kant, and whose influence on later American philosophers such as James, Dewey, Royce and many others is quite considerable, said that belief is the opposite of doubt, and described doubt as an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; and he said further that the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to obtain belief, and that this struggle is inquiry. The object of inquiry is to find out, on the basis of what we already know, something else which we do not know. Of the various methods of inquiry that have been resorted to throughout the ages such as by means of authority, intuition, reason, and experience, the last two seem now to be accepted as reliable chiefly because the results are open to public inspection and experimental verification. But some branches of human knowledge such as history, for example, may not necessarily be susceptible of testing for verification by the experimental method, and where an historical problem with reference to true knowledge presents doubts as to its truth, then we must resort to *reasonable* alternatives for its solution: those that are more nearly consistent with a large number of propositions which we have independent grounds to believe to be true. The suspension of judgement in the hope that some further evidence can be brought to bear later to unravel an historical problem is unreasonable and not conducive to progress if such suspension is not itself based on *a posteriori* arguments supported by other rationally or empirically tested propositions. In point of fact such suspension would not be tantamount to or result in knowledge at all, but would rather be mere doubt based on futile speculation. On the other hand, the acceptance of a reasonable solution to such a problem would encourage further action in a particular direction which could later retroactively, as it were, be used to test further the validity of the solution. The method of empiricism devoid of philosophic rationalism is possible only within certain fields of the various categories of human knowledge, just as rationalism can be practised to operate successfully *solo* in the realm of logic and mathematics. Where a harmonious reconciliation between the two is possible, then the em-

pirical method usually is used to confirm as true what is deduced by the rational method. A classic illustration of the above case is when Einstein's deduction, from propositions contained in his theory of relativity in connection with light rays being bent as they pass near the sun, was some years later confirmed by photographs taken by astronomers at Greenwich. This fact also shows that it is *possible* to achieve what is true, to state a fact, without empirical evidence or confirmation and solely by a rational process of inference. In this case too empirical confirmation is possible only because the nature of the knowledge is such that it is susceptible of empirical verification. In history, we cannot verify by taking photographs of the past, and therefore sometimes it would be ridiculous to demand empirical verification where the knowledge situation tends only towards authority and reason as methods of inquiry.

Among Western Orientalist scholars generally, and particularly among those whose efforts have been and are still directed toward an historical account of Islam and Muslim cultural and literary history in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, doubt seems to have become a *method* of inquiry. In this particular field of studies, however, those scholars did not start their inquiry on the basis of what they already *know*, but rather on the basis of what they *vaguely* know, which in most cases is based on false knowledge, so that the very basis of their inquiry, and the 'knowledge' resulting therefrom, is subject to doubt. Because the doubt entertained is not supported by reason, nor indeed by *true* authority, their doubt has not been productive of progress in their inquiry, which itself is succinct proof that the doubt entertained is of the irrational kind based arbitrarily on mere opinion claimed as 'authoritative', and on what in reality is lack of knowledge of the facts. On vital knowledge concerning Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, for example, more than two hundred years have now elapsed since François Valentyn first among the Dutch made mention of him. Only quite recently, however, as a result of an attitude towards knowledge that is fundamentally different from that of previous scholars, and the effective application of a more rationally orientated methodology, are more facts known and positive knowledge possible, and more gained on the subject than ever before in the span of two centuries. On vital knowledge about the history of

Islam and its cultural role in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago too, much has been said and written for more than a century, though little is really known except a series of questionable conjectures, so that the subject as presented by its historians and Orientalist scholars has now become, to use Matthew Arnold's expression when describing history, "a Mississippi of falsehoods". One of many examples to show how unreasonable doubt and false knowledge have led to careless confusion and detailed error is Blagden's analysis of the Trengganu Inscription, whose insinuations against the truth of the date *clearly* inscribed has even influenced the usually cautious and meticulous Drewes.¹⁸⁶

Because of the peculiar attitude setting up doubt as the basis of inquiry, we find also the modern social scientists and historians of South-east Asia gradually becoming too sceptical and restricting themselves mainly to the pursuit of what they call facts. Like blind bricklayers they laboriously place one brick of fact upon another without having an idea, a vision, a plan of the edifice they hope to build, so that in their tedious endeavours one is reminded of what Voltaire said when he commented on mere preoccupation with facts—even if, as so seldom happens, they were facts, that details that lead to nothing are to history what baggage is to an army, *impedimenta*; and that we must look at things in the large, for the very reason that the human mind is so small, and sinks under the weight of minutiae.

The collection of facts as data for historical inquiry ought not to have reduced the mind of the historian into a kind of passive endurance of the burden in order that the factual data may write incoherently their indomitable will upon it as if it were a Lockian *tabula rasa*. Like Kantians we must see that the mind is not a static, passive thing, but that it organizes the incoherent data into coherent knowledge. If we transpose

186. See C.O. Blagden, "A note on the Trengganu inscription" *JMBRAS*, vol. 2, pt. 3, 1924; and G.W.J. Drewes, "New light on the coming of Islam to Indonesia?" *BKI*, deel 124, 4c *aflevering*, 's. Gravenhage, 1968, p. 455. I am now engaged in writing a short article on the Trengganu Inscription in which it is hoped that the bringing to light of some important data never before discovered will once and for all settle the doubt as to the date. [Since the writing of this note, the article referred to above has appeared published by the Museums Department, States of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1970].

the Kantian epistemology into historical inquiry, it seems to me we must affirm that the facts already established and known to the mind of the historian ought indeed to have themselves been acted upon by the intelligent and productive mind, converting them from a state of conceptual disarray, which is the cause of inability to rationally formulate hypotheses or theories, into the ordered unity of creative conceptual configurations productive of rational and coherent theoretical formulations necessary to historical inquiry.

Is it necessary that, in order to have a satisfactory knowledge of a chair we must first know which shop it came from, how it was brought to the shop, how much was paid for it; what wood it is made from, where the wood was transported from, which forest it came from, how old was the wood, where is the chair located in the room—and many, many other tedious details about the ultimate origin and checkered history of the final progress of all other materials such as the nails and upholstery, the tools and carpenters or craftsmen including, indeed ultimately, the breakdown of the atoms of wood and iron *et cetera* that all go together to make the chair? I agree with Dewey against the empiricists who merely restrict knowledge of the chair only to its shape and colour, but it seems to me that it is not really necessary to know all or most of what is listed above in order to know the chair, for what is important in respect of the chair is *satisfactory* knowledge of it, and this is proven by the fact that to all households the simple chair presents no epistemological problem. Indeed, even when we discuss the chair epistemologically, we are really not so much concerned with the chair, but with the way we think and how we acquire knowledge. Not all objects of knowledge, therefore, require intensive inquiry into their genetic history before we can acquire satisfactory knowledge of them.

Since satisfaction that is brought about by reason and its limitations is here aligned with a concept of knowledge, it is implied that the purpose of knowledge is pragmatic which, in a sense is true. But not all knowledge is problem solving. It may mean the resolution of doubtful situations on purely theoretical levels. Purely theoretical knowledge, that is, speculative knowledge, is not knowledge which is *merely* speculative, for the latter kind of 'knowledge' is just ideas and no more; they

serve no theoretical context, no intellectual panorama or scientific vision, no operational plans to guide future action, and they are no better than daydreams.

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* *This book was in fact completed in November 1968, but due to my assuming numerous academic and administrative responsibilities, and other circumstances which developed during the last two years, I was not able, until quite recently, to send the manuscript to the printers.*

